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Abstract
Proponents of Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) claim it could have an impact greater
than the internet; a breakthrough defying organisational boundaries by securely storing
data across trustless entities. This would allow decisions to be made on verifiable data
in an automated manner without the costs imposed by middlemen, with a correspond-
ing economy-wide impact. Despite this potential, real-world application is embryonic
with public and private sectors rapidly seeking exploitation opportunities. This research
seeks to understand how DLT might apply to the Defence Support Network (DSN), the
mechanism used to sustain UK Armed Forces with materiel and equipment. Drawing on
academic and commercial models, a framework was produced for evaluating DLT use
cases which measures utility, ease of implementation and impact. Using a functionalist
research paradigm, interviews were conducted with DLT and DSN experts on potential
use cases, the data from which was then analysed against a lightweight version of the
evaluation framework. Results show that use cases involving codification, certification
and supply chain provenance merit further investigation. The research concluded with
recommendations that the DSN should pilot DLT use cases, but these should be carefully
selected utilising an evaluation framework due to DLT’s emergent nature.
Keywords
Blockchain; Distributed Ledger Technology; Smart Contracts; Defence Support Network;
Supply Chain
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Introduction
1.1 Overview
Bitcoin, the best known example of Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), has been her-
alded as bigger than the internet by Silicon Valley entrepreneurs (Carlson, 2015). The
UK Government’s Chief Scientific Advisor believes the technology behind Bitcoin could
underpin “potential explosions of creative potential that catalyse exceptional levels of in-
novation” (Walport, 2016). Not surprisingly a host of enterprises are now attempting
to exploit this much trumpeted innovation hoping that, as SAP declare, DLT is ”ideally
suited for... complex industry processes involving many untrusted parties taking part in
reading and writing a multitude of transactions, decisions, and documents” (Galer, 2017).
At its most basic, a Distributed Ledger (DL) is a database distributed across more
than one organisational entity that makes use of cryptography (Martinovic, Kello and
Sluganovic, 2017); typically it is used to store transactions of anything that might be
considered an asset (e.g. cash, physical items, personal data, etc). DL’s unique value lies
in sharing or validating the database across many different people or organisations, who
do not necessarily trust each other. This is achieved through a cryptographic consensus
between all organisations, so that the data held is verified and represents one immutable
version of the truth; once recorded, no party can amend the data.
If this represents DLT’s uniqueness, its promise is in reducing the friction between
organisations. When each organisation holding its own siloed version of events share or
agree data across organisations, a transactional cost is entailed. Such cost is reflected
by the existence of roles and processes whose function is to verify transactions, e.g so-
licitors, notaries, audits and performance measurement. Given that once data is in a DL
it is accepted as an accurate reflection of events, DLT eliminates the agreeing stage and
the transactional cost, thereby increasing the efficiency of inter-party transactions (Dav-
idson, De Filippi and Potts, 2018). This dissertation analyses how DLT might be applied
to Defence, specifically to examine how it might benefit the Defence Support Network
(DSN).
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Figure 1.1: Variants of DLT (Walport, 2016)
1.2 Definitive articles
Given that DLT is an emergent technology, there is currently little agreement to standard
terms used, although international standards are being developed (International Organiz-
ation for Standardization, 2017). In view of this DLT, should not be referred to mono-
lithically, as one might to the concept of relational databases. For the purpose of this
dissertation the definition used by the UK’s Chief Scientific Officer (Walport, 2016) will
be adopted as at Figure 1.1.
This shows DLT is a wide term covering many applications, used to contrast this
technology from predecessors - namely organisationally centred ledgers, whether paper
ledgers, relational databases or NoSQL. Walport (2016) further defines a DL as “a type
of database that is spread across multiple sites, countries or institutions, and is typically
public” - although as Figure 1.1 shows private versions are equally valid. This definition
is not universally accepted - Swanson (2015a) asserts a DL has to involve a legal entity;
while Mainelli (2017) prefers the term Mutual Distributed Ledger, usefully emphasising
that the data is “held in common or owned by no one.”
In the wider media the term ‘blockchain’ is better known than DLT (Deshpande et
al., 2017). Blockchain, the technology underlying the cryptocurrency Bitcoin, is a list
of transactions recorded in a block that is linked or ‘chained’ through cryptography to
previous blocks of transactions. As Section 2.1 examines, Bitcoin is the first example of a
blockchain and DL. Bitcoin is not though the only blockchain, many others have utilised
this format, for instance IBM markets a “blockchain for business” (Hartman, 2017).
However not all DLs are blockchains. For instance, IOTA designed for the internet of
things, uses “the tangle” where instead of transactions being recorded in blocks they are
recorded in a directed acyclic graph (Popov, 2016). Due to the prevalence of the term,
even DLT that do not rely on blockchains use the term liberally. An example is Guard-
time’s Keyless Signature Infrastructure which is referred to as blockchain technology even
though it does not make use of blocks of transactions, but rather a Merkle tree culminat-
ing in an internet published hash calendar (Buldas, Kroonmaa and Laanoja, 2013). Such
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is the market hype that even vendors selling an implementation of Git version-control (a
common tool) claim to have a DLT product (Gerard, 2017, p. 112). This semantic flex-
ibility is partly because Bitcoin’s blockchain, although unique in itself, is based on the
synergy of already existing components (Narayanan and Clark, 2017), further discussed
in Chapter 2.
The UK’s Chief Scientific Officer at Figure 1.1 makes a distinction between public
and private DLTs, the former being subdivided further into permissionless versus per-
missioned. At the far left of the diagram is the blockchain (i.e. Bitcoin’s ledger) as
an example of both public and permissionless DLT - anyone can view the transactions
contained therein (public) and anyone can act as nodes on the network (permissionless)
(Huberman, Leshno and Moallemi, 2017). Ripple is an example of a public, permissioned
DL (Schwartz, Youngs and Britto, 2014) - that is transactions are available for all to see
but nodes (or ‘gateways’ in Ripple terminology) are run by trusted parties (i.e. financial
institutions). Corda, a DLT intended for use by banks, sits on the right of Figure 1.1’s
DLT spectrum being private and permissioned - this network is used only by authorised
organisations, with transaction details only accessible to the parties involved and regulat-
ors (Brown et al., 2016). Indeed Corda is attempting to implement hardware-level privacy
via chip-manufacturer Intel (Slemmer, 2018). Lundbæk and Huth (2017) however argue
these terms, although used extensively in strategy papers, have little technical implement-
ation consensus - and furthermore cannot be verified due to proprietary source code and
documentation.
1.3 Code is law
Smart contracts (SC), a concept that predates Bitcoin (Szabo, 1997), is frequently as-
sociated with DLT. Contracts constitute a written agreement between two parties where
services or items are transacted based on conditions being met. SCs are the evolution of
this agreement into a logic-based form implemented by software. Szabo (1997) provides
the example of a vending machine - a user provides cash and the machine returns an item
with no further human interaction. A SC could be layered over a DL and conducts activity
when certain conditions are met. If a DL was used for land registry (as Sweden and India
are evaluating (Bal, 2017)), then a SC could be instigated so that when a change of owner-
ship was recorded, the contract executes a monetary transaction from the buyer instantly.
If cryptocurrency was used as the medium of exchange, a phenomenon already observed
(Prynn, 2017), this becomes even more plausible. SC are also relevant for more complex
transactions, e.g. a farmer seeks insurance cover for temperature fluctuations outside an
agreed range over an agreed time period (Mainelli and Manson, 2017). By automating
transactions, SC promotes efficiency and could lead to structural changes in sectors that
manage transactions.
Building on SCs are Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAO) (Johnston et
al., 2013). DAOs are established by entrepreneur-programmers founding businesses com-
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prised entirely of software; these entities perform transactions dependent on algorithmic
business plans. They would receive payments from clients, execute trades based on a DL
and then reimburse owners with profits; all without human agency. Ethereum is a DL
created to act as a platform for DAOs (Morris, 2015).
A prototype DAO is Bitbarista (Pschetz et al., 2017), a coffee machine paid in crypto-
currency (although not unique in this aspect (Beck, Stenum Czepluch et al., 2016)). The
Bitbarista uses the freedoms offered by cryptocurrencies to automate business processes
such as ordering refills online and rewarding people for maintenance tasks (i.e. refilling
coffee beans). Using DLT removes barriers associated with traditional financial struc-
tures, such as accounts accessible to legal entities only, as opposed to machines. Although
unlikely to threaten Starbucks, it is an illustration of how removing frictions might shift
how enterprises operate.
1.4 Defence Support Network
This dissertation examines how DLT might be applied in the environment of the DSN.
UK military doctrine (Ministry of Defence, 2015b, p. 9) defines the DSN as:
“a flexible set of supply chains connecting points of production and use,
ensuring the most appropriate and efficient use of resources across the Whole
Force, maximising information and technology to assure logistic support to
operational commanders. The DSN consists of a series of linked nodes through
which support is delivered in an agile manner, giving end-to-end visibility and
control.”
Although this statement opens by referring to tangibles - i.e. supply chains, production
and use; the latter sentence talks more generally of ‘support’. Support, in a Defence
context, is defined by the same doctrine as encompassing, as well as physical items such
as logistics and equipment, more abstract areas such as legal, medical and infrastructure.
This dissertation focuses on the concrete embodiment of this support, such as equipment
and items of supply.
The definition also refers to the ‘Whole Force,’ an acknowledgement of Defence’s
dependence on a wider pool than uniformed personnel - including civil servants, other
government departments, contractors and external parties. This is illustrated by the rich
picture at Figure 1.2 visualising the many organisations comprising the DSN. The re-
cent Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts brought into contrast MoD’s increased reliance on
contractor support (Ministry of Defence, 2015a, p. 34). This ties strongly into the DLT
concept - if DLs are concerned with sharing information across organisational boundaries,
then the more boundaries, the more impact DLT stands to make.
Information and technology is given a central role in the DSN according to the above
definition. The MoD has been extensively criticised (Parliament. House of Commons,
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Figure 1.2: The Defence Support Network (Ministry of Defence, 2015b, p. 10)
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2011) for weaknesses in exploiting logistics information, with multiple failures in under-
standing the complex interplay of assets and supply chains. This makes a strong case for
investigating how DLT, a new paradigm for managing information, might be beneficially
applied to the DSN.
1.5 Research question, aims and objectives
1.5.1 Research question
Understanding the background that has led to this research the question that this disserta-
tion sets out to answer is:
How could DLT and SC be beneficially applied to the DSN?
1.5.2 Research aim
A logical conclusion of this Research Question is the following Research Aim:
The aim of this research is to understand how DLT and SC might be applied
to the DSN and the potential benefits.
1.5.3 Research objectives
The Research Aim breaks down into the following objectives: :
1. To define DLT (Section 1.1) and smart contracts (Section 1.3).
2. To define the DSN (Section 1.4) and how DLT might address the challenges it faces
(Section 5.1.2).
3. To create a framework for evaluating the utility of DLT against use cases (Section
5.2), drawing from academic or business models (Section 5.1).
4. To assess generic DSN use cases against a lightweight version of the evaluation
framework identified in Objective 3 (Section 5.3), by gathering quantitative and
qualitative evidence from subject matter experts (Section 5.4).
5. To explore further use cases of how DLT might apply to the DSN beyond the generic
use cases of Objective 4 (Section 5.5).
Chapter 2
Literature review
A literature review of the concept of DLT is presented first, followed by a thematically
structured analysis of its potential wider impact.
2.1 Genesis block
No discussion of DLT can be complete without referring to its genesis: the Bitcoin white
paper by the pseudonymous Satoshi Nakamoto (2008). This paper was distributed out-
side of either academic or commercial circles, having its roots in the cryptoanarchist com-
munity (Frisby, 2014, p. 36).
Bitcoin introduced four key concepts as proposed by Antonopoulos (2014, p. 40):
1. The Bitcoin protocol itself - a decentralised peer-to-peer network.
2. The blockchain - a public transaction ledger.
3. Rules for establishing consensus for validating independent transactions and issuing
currency.
4. A proof-of-work algorithm - the mechanism by which global consensus is reached
on which ledger is valid.
This combination for the first time allowed the creation of electronic cash without re-
lying on financial institutions to serve as trusted third parties. Satoshi argues that remov-
ing these institutions is beneficial as it will reduce transaction costs, which are created
forming and enforcing agreements (Cooper and John, 2011, p. 605). When trusted third
parties are involved, they have the power to reverse payments or alter balances which leads
to an increase in the requirement for trust. As greater trust is needed, greater amounts of
information must be accumulated by participants in the network, thus increasing costs.
Szabo states the point more forcefully: “trusted third parties are security holes” (Szabo,
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2001); arguing that the most expensive and vulnerable part of any security system that re-
lies on trusted third parties, will be that third party itself. North (1987) shows transaction
costs prevent economic development, i.e. the cost used to fulfil this ‘trust’ function (e.g.
lawyers, auditors) could be utilised more productively in creating goods or services.
Bitcoin was not the first attempt to introduce electronic cash (excluding fiat money
accounted for electronically), failed previous examples were e-gold and beenz (Eiland,
2017). These endeavours were unsuccessful because they had not solved three funda-
mental questions (Antonopoulos, 2014, p. 40):
1. Is the money authentic, i.e. not counterfeit?
2. Is the money unspent - also known as double-spend where somebody spends the
same money twice?
3. Is this money claimed by me (as opposed to someone else)?
An explanation of the technology is necessary to understand how Bitcoin solves these
problems. Imagine a situation where Alice and Bob wish to exchange bitcoin. Each will
have a wallet - software that is able to conduct Bitcoin transactions. Each wallet will
contain a number of addresses; addresses simply being containers to hold any amount of
bitcoin. Each address will have an associated private and public key. Assuming Alice
wished to pay Bob one bitcoin she would transfer this by using her private key to digitally
sign what is known as a hash of the previous transaction and Bob’s public key, as at figure
2.1.
A hash is an algorithm that takes an arbitrary amount of digital data; which could be
anything from a Microsoft word document, jpeg photo or text file; and returns a fixed
length value (known as a digest). As an example if the text from the abstract of this
dissertation is run through a SHA1 function the resulting value is:
f4f3c70d905f007f6c069def9b66082aaab22bee
Every time the abstract of this dissertation is run through the SHA1 algorithm it will
produce the same value. However it is computationally difficult to retrieve the original
text (the abstract) if one is simply provided with the hash value. Should any change be
made in the original text, the resulting hash will be different. For instance if the abstract
is run again through the algorithm, but with the final full-stop omitted the result will be:
d21a01538b8c87394d44567269f6ac5aa22335e0
Despite the input text differing by only one character, the resulting hash is completely
different. Hashing therefore allows a piece of data to be reduced to a shorter fixed length
value. This can be used to quickly determine whether the original data has been altered -
by hashing the suspect data and checking it matches the hash value recorded earlier.
To return to Alice and Bob’s bitcoin transfer - this transaction is now broadcast to the
network. At the same time other transactions are also being broadcast to the network;
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Figure 2.1: Bitcoin transactions (Nakamoto, 2008)
which are bundled up into blocks together. Other users, known as miners, will now create
cryptographic hashes of the data contained within those blocks. The first miner to create a
hash that conforms to a certain format (specifically that it begins with a prescribed number
of zeros) is rewarded with newly minted bitcoins. The creation of this winning hash
however is computationally difficult - it is accomplished by adding a random segment
(known as a nonce) to the block of transactions, so eventually resulting in a hash matching
the required format. In this way a new block is created on the ledger. This new block will
contain the winning hash of the last block, and the next block the winning hash of this
one and so forth. Because the hash of the last block is in the current block, changing any
transactions in the last block will cause a hash mismatch and alert all to the attack.
In this way the transaction of one bitcoin between Alice and Bob cannot be altered
in any way. Alice cannot change her mind and take it back, so defeating the double-
spend problem where Alice tries to give the same one bitcoin to both Bob and Charlie
- as the first transaction of this bitcoin (to Bob) is recorded immutably in the ledger and
considered the ‘valid’ transaction. It also means a malicious actor, such as Mallory, cannot
change the transaction to divert Alice’s bitcoin to her. As more blocks are created, each
containing the hash of the last, the previous transactions are less vulnerable to attack, due
to the increasing number of blocks that would need to be changed.
To attack the network successfully Mallory would have to take over 51% of the nodes
so allowing her version of the chain to be accepted. However to do this the amount of
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Organisationally
centralised
Organisationally
decentralised
Logically
centralised e.g. Paypal
***new***
blockchain
Logically
decentralised e.g. Excel e.g. email
Table 2.1: Foundational innovation of the blockchain (Wenger, 2014)
computing power (and associated costs such as electricity, hardware, etc) would be so
great, it would make more financial sense to use those resources to support the network
and reap the benefits of mining. Indeed any successful attack would likely cause the value
of Bitcoin to drop, again removing the motivation of financial gain.
Although a considerable technical achievement, it does not necessarily explain the ex-
citement around Bitcoin. Reasons behind this are varied; many early libertarian advocates
welcomed it as a transfer of government financial power to individuals with the prospect
of states no longer controlling the money supply (Frisby, 2014, p. 152). Others foresee
its role in transforming the economy and questioning the assumptions of the industrial
age - Antonopoulos for instance asks whether in a truly digital economy salaries should
be streamed by the minute rather than arriving in monthly instalments (Dale, 2017). Al-
ternatively cynics suggest that interest is primarily fuelled by speculation (Baur, Hongkik
and A. Lee, 2018), comparing it to the seventeenth century tulip craze which bankrupted
many investors (Jones, 2017).
2.2 The root of all evil
The applications of DLT go beyond cryptocurrency. Ledgers have been a fundamental
feature of trade since ancient times (Gray, 1996) so it is unsurprising that this technolo-
gical shift could have wider impact.
Although it is clear why Bitcoin is a novel approach to digital cash, Wenger (2014)
provides a good explanation of why blockchain represents a discontinuum with previous
technology as a means of organising information, as shown at Table 2.1.
Wenger posits that DLT represents a new category of information management - lo-
gically centralised, but organisationally decentralised. Using the Wenger classifications
there are many examples of organisationally centralised information technologies in the
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world - Paypal and Excel are two examples, both owned by organisations who chose what
version to release and their retail price. However they differ in their ‘logical’ centralisa-
tion - it is possible for Alice to send Bob an Excel spreadsheet and for Bob to edit that
spreadsheet independently of Alice. Excel is therefore logically decentralised.
Paypal however is logically centralised - if Alice sends Bob £1 via Paypal the ac-
counts of Alice, Bob and the system as a whole have to correlate. Whereas email is both
organisationally and logically decentralised; no single organisation owns email and Alice
sending Bob an email is unrelated to other people’s emails.
Blockchain is a new category in that there is no central organisation, no permission is
needed to write a new software wallet or run a network mining node, however there is a
logical centralisation - when Alice sends Bob bitcoin the entire system is aware of that.
Ludwin (2016) takes this point further by arguing that it is unhelpful to think of Bitcoin
as a currency but rather as a “new asset class that enables decentralised applications.” The
utility of a decentralised application (DApp) being that it is organisationally decentralised
- no one person owns it. Ludwin however proposes that DApps, although useful, have
disadvantages due to inefficiency.
Not all DLT has to use coins or tokens. Bitcoin uses a Proof-of-Work (PoW) con-
sensus mechanism meaning miners are rewarded with the ability to add blocks to the
chain (so earning bitcoin) dependent on the amount of compute they have undertaken
(Bonneau et al., 2015). However there are other consensus mechanisms, such as Proof-
of-Stake (PoS), where the more tokens you have (e.g. stake) the greater your probability
of creating the next block (Bentov, Gabizon and Mizrahi, 2016). PoS is less energy in-
tensive and more environmentally sustainable than PoW (O’Dwyer and Malone, 2014);
although PoS has been criticised for unfairly rewarding those who already have amassed
the most (Mamoria, 2017). Meanwhile Proof-of-Authority (PoA) is a consensus mech-
anism where those involved in establishing the network have decided which nodes are
deemed reliable (Cachin, 2016) and is synonymous with permissioned blockchains. PoA
has been criticised as removing one of the central aspects of blockchain - achieving trust
without a central authority - and as such has been criticised as “probably not [a] real
blockchain” (Bashir, 2017, p. 28). There are yet other mechanisms for consensus; e.g.
Proof-of-Burn, Proof-of-Capacity (Tasca and Thanabalasingham, 2017); which are out-
side this dissertation’s scope.
2.3 Two sides to the coin
DL is a new category of technology that could lead to a swathe of different business mod-
els (D. Tapscott and A. Tapscott, 2017). Mainelli and Gupta (2017) point to an earlier
technological shift that occurred with the rise of digital mapping, combined with GPS,
which allowed the real-world to be visualised on computers leading to challenger upstarts
such as Uber. DLT could allow a similar shift with the digitalisation of business funda-
mentals; if the transactions and contracts that are the lifeblood of business, previously
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Figure 2.2: Sharing vs Proving DLT (Author’s own work)
locked within company silos but now shared between enterprises, are able to be manipu-
lated digitally new worlds of possibility could emerge (Iansiti and Lakhani, 2017).
However as has already been covered there is considerable variety in what can be
thought of as DLT and correspondingly great variety in what DLT might be used for.
Ultimately however all the technologies in this area are considered with one or other
business problem: Sharing or Proving, and in some circumstances both. This is illustrated
at Figure 2.2.
Bitcoin sits in the middle of this Venn diagram being a DL that both proves and shares
data. When Alice sends Bob one bitcoin the technology is both used to prove that Alice
has one bitcoin to send and share the data that Alice has transferred one bitcoin to Bob
to all other participants on the network. However it is not necessary to have both aspects
present within DLT.
The share use case is exemplified by an example provided by Hyperledger Fabric
(IBM, 2016) where a blockchain is established for a consortium of companies involved in
car leasing. The participants; such as the vehicle manufacturer, dealerships and scrap mer-
chant; all use the ledger to access information such as the Vehicle Identification Number
and maintenance logs. All participants are now sharing one view of the vehicle history -
IBM gives the example that if a recall had to be organised this would be far more efficient
and effective if all participants were using the same blockchain. However although we can
see data share occurring, there is no prove. For instance if the manufacturer were to er-
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roneously ascribe the wrong Vehicle Identification Number to the car record there would
be no way of verifying that fact by looking at the information contained on-chain. Rather
physical verification would need to take place that off-chain reality (i.e. the number writ-
ten on the car) matched the data on-chain. The situation further complicates if there are
malignant actors within the consortium. For instance if the scrap merchant is involved
in an illegal ‘cut and shut’ scheme where two halves of old cars are welded together to
form a ‘new’ vehicle (BBC, 2000); this blockchain would not guarantee that cars marked
as destroyed had been so. This can be considered the digital-physical gap: the difficulty
of achieving a link between the immutable digital object on-chain and its twin mutable
physical object in the real world.
The right side of the Venn diagram is entirely prove and no share. Guardtime’s Key-
less Signature Infrastructure (KSI) Blockchain creates chain-of-custody information for
digital assets - any time a protected file (e.g. MS Word document, JPEG image) is modi-
fied, created, deleted or transmitted there is forensic evidence of that activity, admissible
in a court of law (M. C. Johnson, 2014). This technology works by taking a hash of any
protected asset, combining those hashes with other hashes using a Merkle-tree and then
publishing that data in a hash calendar (whereby the current hash is combined with the
previous hash) as demonstrated at Figure 2.3. Although this is far removed from Bitcoin,
it is described as blockchain technology by the creators (Guardtime Federal, 2016) and
Walport (2016) counts it as DLT. The Estonian government, who employ this propriet-
ary technology, elaborate by stating that KSI Blockchain was being tested in Estonia in
2008, prior to the Bitcoin white-paper, at which point the term blockchain was known as
”hash-linked time stamping” (E-estonia.com, 2017). In this use case however the utility
comes entirely from the prove aspect, there is no share as with the car lease demonstra-
tion. Rather here a distributed ledger acts purely to provide provenance, not to distribute
data. A similar initiative is Archangel which looks to verify the contents of the National
Archive to prove items have not changed over time (Thereaux, 2017). This share versus
prove dichotomy illustrates how radically different approaches to solving different busi-
ness problems are still covered under the umbrella of DLT. In some ways DLT can be
compared to a clawhammer: both Guardtime KSI Blockchain and IBM Hyperledger Fab-
ric share a common stem (the clawhammer shaft) but are used for purposes as radically
different as hammering versus removing nails.
Praise for use cases which move away from Bitcoin’s original conception of both share
and prove is not universal. Antonopoulos (2017) for instance mocks how the conversation
has turned increasingly anodyne as development has moved from bitcoin to blockchain to
DLT, which he believes is led by vested corporate interests attempting to head off disrup-
tion. Here he makes a parallel between blockchain’s maturity and the internet circa 1997;
although there were attempts to use the internet for ambitious plans (e.g. grocery deliver-
ies) these failed until a sufficiently dense level of adoption had been established through
the relatively simple application of email. Similarly he argues DLT will not be used for
ambitious plans, such as real estate title, until cryptocurrencies are used for everyday
transactions; at which point a tipping point will have been reached which challenges the
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Figure 2.3: KSI Federated Hash Tree (Zatyko, 2015)
establishment (e.g. banks are out-competed in their core business of banking). Similarly
Song (2018) asserts that blockchain without bitcoin is equivalent to selling “snake oil.”
These viewpoints contrast strongly with that of Walport (2016) which is about working
within current systems; this conflict between revolutionary and evolutionary paths is a
recurring theme and will be examined more closely in the literature search.
2.4 Search strategy
DLT can therefore be seen as a unique concept that has emerged from counter-cultural
roots and has generated considerable debate on how it can be best utilised. In understand-
ing how it might serve the needs of the DSN it would be helpful to survey the academic
literature, as well as this being a required Individual Learning Outcome of an ICM Re-
search Project. A structured search using metadata only was conducted on IEEE Xplore’s
Digital Library for the search terms shown in Table 2.2. Because the term ‘blockchain’
(or derivatives) is used in other academic disciplines, the search is limited to a computer-
science relevant database. No time period was specified, and no restriction on materiel
(e.g., journals, books etc) was set. The search was limited to English material only due to
resources available.
The Alan Turing Institute notes the prodigious rate of output on the subject of block-
chains (averaging 250 papers per year since 2014), but that most of these have appeared
in the form of white papers outside traditional academic peer-reviewed literature (Bano et
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Search Term Frequency
blockchain 236
bitcoin 213
distributed ledger 22
Table 2.2: Search term frequency using IEEE Xplore dated 14 Nov 17
al., 2017). Thus grey literature has been included separately in the results of the literature
search.
Interest in DLT is not limited to the English speaking world. For instance China is
involved in cryptocurrency mining and speculation - in 2015 88% of total Bitcoin trades
took place there (Pel, 2015); while political support for DLT research comes from Pres-
ident Xi Jinping himself (Cheng, 2018). Japan and South Korea share similar enthusiasm
for the technology (Price, 2017). Searching the China Academic Journals Database using
the sinographs for bitcoin,比特币, yielded 669 articles; a higher count than that of IEEE
Xplore. This finding is borne out by the China Intellectual Property Office filing nearly
140 DLT related patents in the last three years (Zhao, 2018). Thus future literature review
should endeavour to cover non-English language publications.
Table 2.2 shows 55% of the search results included the term ‘blockchain’ but not
‘bitcoin’ (with the remaining 45% having the terms ‘blockchain’ and ‘bitcoin’). This is in
contrast to an earlier literature review (Yli-Huumo et al., 2016) which found that 80.5% of
academic output focused on Bitcoin rather than wider applications. This difference may
be due to the stricter search criteria for this study (which selected 41 papers). Alternatively
the greater number of blockchain minus bitcoin results, may represent the increasingly
popularity view that DLT not Bitcoin is where potential lies (Knight, 2017).
It is worth noting the UK government’s preferred term, ‘distributed ledger techno-
logy’ (Walport, 2016) is less frequently used in the literature. This term having such little
traction shows stakeholders have not coalesced around agreed definitions, although there
have been attempts in the literature to define a DLT ontology (Tasca and Thanabalasing-
ham, 2017). The British Standards Institution (Deshpande et al., 2017) has highlighted
that the lack of industry standards for this emergent technology makes comparison or
categorisation challenging. They also believe that standards would drive other benefits
such as addressing the concerns of security, privacy and data governance. Insurance in-
dustry research (Mainelli and Mills, 2016) tallies with this, proposing that the introduc-
tion of voluntary standards markets would allow organisations to manage risk and reduce
regulatory uncertainty via establishing compliance and verification regimes. Figure 2.4
illustrates what standards might apply.
Although how these standards might apply to DL goes beyond this dissertation’s
scope, one area from Figure 2.4 that is worth exploring are standards for ‘interoperab-
ility.’ There are real-world examples of attempts to integrate DLs - e.g. IBM’s cross-
border trade payments project (Castillo, 2017) uses both private (Hyperledger) and public
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Figure 2.4: Representation of the standards environment for DLT (Mainelli and Mills,
2016)
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(Stellar) blockchains in conjunction; the former for transaction clearing, the latter for
settlement payment. Not that this represents a standard, simply that agreement on inter-
operability can be reached.
Common interoperability standards underpins today’s networked world: Hypertext
Transfer Protocol and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol standards allow users to commu-
nicate across networks and applications, but no similar standard exists for DLT (Strajnar,
2015). Of course not all technologies have common standards. For instance DLT’s fun-
damentals are compared to a database; yet the recent big-data NoSQL databases are a
competing set of technologies without a common standard (Sadalage and Fowler, 2012,
p. 9). This though could be a false comparison - DLT’s power is sharing data across or-
ganisational boundaries. Scenarios can be envisaged where an organisational grouping
using a DL, e.g. a fishing co-operative verifying their environmentally sustainable pro-
cesses (Project Provenance Ltd, 2016), have a requirement to pass information to another
organisational grouping using a different DL, e.g. to grocery retailers selling the seafood
and using a DL for food-safety (Kharif, 2016). Hardjono, Lipton and Pentland (2018)
illustrates how in the same way the internet is neutral as to which network your packet
travels on, applications might be agnostic as to which DL your transaction is recorded on.
Common standards would allow interoperability between these types of DL to become
routine, rather than being an expensive ad-hoc process.
Indeed, Mougayar (2017) argues that before DLT can become as ubiquitous as the
web, common standards are required to enable interoperability. The opposing case is
that standards might damage this emerging technology, freeze-framing it prematurely,
which Mougayar (2016) himself previously posits. Either way momentum is building
for standards, with the International Organization for Standardization drafting proposals
(2017).
This lack of standards represents a challenge for literature reviews, as Webster and
Watson (2002) argue the first step of academic enquiry is classification. As yet there have
been few comprehensive reviews, and much of this focuses on the technical (Tasca and
Thanabalasingham, 2017) rather than on enterprise applications. Additionally defence,
by its very nature, is guarded on revealing how they might employ new technologies.
Although there are exceptions to this; for instance US Air Force cyber-security orient-
ated studies (Barnas, 2016), Washington think-tank papers (Hsieh and Ravich, 2017) and
Canadian defence research (Willink, 2018); the sub-set of the literature specifically con-
sidering how defence might use DLT is small.
2.5 Thematic analysis
This lack of precedence as well being a challenge, can be seen as an opportunity to create
a small contribution to the field. A thematic analysis was chosen because Saunders, Lewis
and Thornhill (2016, p. 80) conclude that those papers that contribute most to an area of
study follow this approach.
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Three themes in the literature were identified: that of supporting the ‘revolutionary’,
‘evolutionary’ or ‘reactionary’ paradigm.
2.5.1 Revolutionary
As previously discussed DLT’s roots lay within Bitcoin, emerging from the cryptoan-
archist and cypherpunk movements. The former movement is a political philosophy re-
cognising no laws apart from those enforced by code, the latter a technological vision
of socio-political change limiting the power of authorities (Narayanan, 2013a). These
aligned movements took early inspiration from Chaum (1985), who proposed a decent-
ralised digital cash that empowers individuals, rather than governments or corporations.
Later seminal texts ‘A declaration of the independence of cyberspace’ and ‘A Cypher-
punk’s Manifesto’ (Ludlow, 2001, pp. 27-30, 81-83) saw an opportunity in technological
progress to break with the industrial nations’ established order. Early victories came in
defeating US Government bans on the export of encryption software PGP (Pretty Good
Privacy) software (Gellman and Dixon, 2011, p. 152).
Despite these successes, by the 2010s Narayanan (2013b) declared that “cypherpunk
crypto [has] failed to materialise,” while Zittrain (2012) foresaw “the end of crypto.” They
argued that the difficulties of implementing cryptography, plus the resistance of corporates
and democratic governments, meant that the cypherpunk movement would not have the
impact imagined.
However Bitcoin’s arrival marks a resurgence of the cypherpunk movement; both from
the original proponents who always had digital cash central to their vision (Torpey, 2016),
and from a new wave of adherents (Bartlett, 2016). Links between these communities are
often explicit - for instance the Bitcoin subredit directs new joiners to ‘A Cypherpunk’s
Manifesto’ (Reddit.com, 2018).
Following cypherpunk’s near-death; why then did Bitcoin, followed by the DLT paradigm,
emerge when it did? The creator’s secrecy, the pseudonymous Satoshi Nakamoto, thwarts
a definitive answer; although there appear to be two drivers: technical and political. From
a technical standpoint, as acknowledged by Nakamoto (2008), Bitcoin built upon much
previous work (Bonneau et al., 2015), as illustrated at Figure 2.5, such as the Hashcash
project which used Proof-of-Work to counter email spam (Back, 2002).
Therefore Bitcoin partly emerged when it did because the technical foundations had
caught up with cypherpunk’s aim of digital gold. The second driver, political, is some-
thing Nakamoto explains less: “it’s very attractive to the libertarian viewpoint if we
can explain [Bitcoin] properly. I’m better with code than with words though” (Jansen,
2012). Nakamoto was familiar with Austrian economics (libertarianism’s fountainhead)
(J. Davis, 2011), which proposes government interference rarely benefits economic sys-
tems. Bitcoin explicitly references 2008’s Global Financial Crisis, inserting this phrase
in the genesis block: “The Times 03/Jan/2009 Chancellor on brink of second bailout for
bank” (Maurer, Nelms and Swartz, 2013). Libertarians would object to governments cre-
ating money, as in The Times headline, to save financial institutions. Bitcoin with its limit
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Figure 2.5: Chronology of Bitcoin’s technological precursors (Narayanan and Clark,
2017)
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of 21 million coins and resistance to any central authority, is a strong reaction to these
events by those who question the state’s role in economic affairs. The MoD’s Develop-
ment, Concepts and Doctrine Centre even forecasts longer term scenarios where crypto-
currencies might challenge the state’s dominance (Ministry of Defence, 2014, p. 78). The
second reason for Bitcoin’s emergence was therefore the political environment which Na-
kamoto, and allies, were reacting to.
Given this it is unsurprising much debate around DLT (especially in cryptocurren-
cies) has been couched in the language of opposition to established order, bluntly put by
Antonopoulos (Bundrick, 2015):
“You put an open, decentralized ecosystem: open source, open standards,
open networking and the intelligence and innovation pushed all the way to
the edge — put that against a closed system, controlled by a central provider,
whose permission you need in order to innovate and who will only innovate
at the exclusion and competition of all of the other companies — and we will
crush them.”
Even the less colourful Bank of Finland uses the term “revolutionary” to describe this
“marvellous structure” (Huberman, Leshno and Moallemi, 2017) thereby sharing com-
mon ground with firebrands such as Antonopoulos.
The adjective ‘disruptive’ is often applied to emergent technology; however given
the regularity of disruptors being bought out by the very firms they are trying to disrupt
(Faktor, 2016), this hardly captures DLT’s transformative vision. Rather ‘revolutionary’ -
seeking to upend the established order - is used as one thematic grouping in this disserta-
tion instead.
2.5.2 Evolutionary
Despite its roots in radical thought, DLT is being increasingly co-opted by established
firms. Figure 2.6 shows the heavy involvement of multi-national finance and technology
firms within DLT, often with one firm backing several initiatives. Companies such as J.P.
Morgan and Goldman Sachs are hardly edgy upstarts wanting to turn the system upside
down.
In a similar vein ‘evolutionary’ also covers the phenomenon of IT departments pro-
moting DLT simply to make “boring back-office coordination work sexy” so prompting
funding (Levine, 2016). Indeed the Centre for Evidence Based Management claim the
most successful use of DLT is where it is a “catalyst” to implement benefits such as com-
mon data standards and automation, even though much of this work could have been
done without DLT; or where DLT is the clarion-call for change but the eventual final
product shares more similarities with conventional systems (Parliament. House of Com-
mons, 2018). One might argue an example of this is R3 Corda’s product which began as a
“blockchain for finance” but engineering choices moved it away from Bitcoin’s architec-
ture (Gendal Brown, 2016). Although critics such as Gerard (2017, p. 123) might reach
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Figure 2.6: Financial industry involvement with DLT (Nordrum, 2017)
the conclusion that this is a “blockchain product” that does not contain a blockchain; it is
also possible to see this as the evolving nature of DLT which, as Section 2.4 discussed,
lacks a common definition. For these reasons ‘evolutionary’ is the second thematic group-
ing.
2.5.3 Reactionary
Both the revolutionary and evolutionary paradigm agree that DLT has potential benefits.
Others are less optimistic: one argument is that mass take-up of DLT is unlikely given
the existing good alternatives, with comparisons being made between DLT and open-
source Linux as a Windows replacement for consumers (Evans, 2017). Conte de Leon
et al (2017) goes further suggesting DLT is inferior to existing systems: the interactions
of independent agents are by definition complex so DLT proves difficult to verify it will
work correctly. Even proponents acknowledge DLT is typically slow (Greenspan, 2016).
The Centre for Evidence Based Management concludes that much of the hype is due to
the disconnect between senior management and IT departments; with DLT simply being
the latest fad that offers “magic wand pixie dust” to solve enterprise problems (Parlia-
ment. House of Commons, 2018). Gerard (2017, p. 17) expresses the maximally negative
view that the technology as a whole is as unstable as its originating anarchist sub-culture,
with the primary driver greed and naivety. ‘Reactionary’ therefore defines the final them-
atic grouping.
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2.5.4 Units of Analysis
These three broad themes cover wide ground. Therefore to make the critical literature
review more meaningful a further dimension was added - units of analysis (UoA) (Web-
ster and Watson, 2002). This was needed as DLs that are revolutionary in one sense, for
instance a radical method of allocating domain names so challenging internet governance
(Swan, 2015, p. 30-33), might have minimal impact elsewhere (e.g. socio-cultural). An
analysis framework could therefore usefully sub-categorise the impact DLT might have. A
number of frameworks were considered, including commercial, for instance Porter’s Five
Forces model which analyses market competition (Porter, 2008). Academic DLT liter-
ature reviews which used conceptual groupings were also studied, specifically: keyword
analysis (Notheisen, Hawlitschek and Weinhardt, 2017; Holub and J. Johnson, 2018),
social media context (Risius and Spohrer, 2017), engineering layers (Hawlitschek, No-
theisen and Teubner, 2018) and technical challenges (Yli-Huumo et al., 2016). The UoA
eventually selected is recommended by the British Computer Society for business ana-
lysis (Cadle, Paul and Turner, 2010), and is established in information systems research
(Peng and Nunes, 2007; Bakri et al., 2012) - PESTLE (Political, Economic, Social, Tech-
nological, Legal, Ecological) analysis. One criticism of a PESTLE approach is it lacks
a Defence research focus, however understanding impacts wider than Defence enables
discovery of cross-cutting or unanticipated applications. It is therefore using PESTLE,
coupled with the revolutionary, evolutionary and reactionary themes that the literature
will be reviewed.
2.6 Matrix
Items relevant to the research question of how DLT might apply to the DSN were selec-
ted from the IEEE Xplore database (Section 2.4). These papers then had their citations
reviewed and, using the Web of Science, forward-citations were also reviewed. Addition-
ally where it was felt the IEEE Xplore database had not provided enough coverage in any
UoA, databases from Cranfield University, Scopus and Google Scholar were also utilised,
using the same search terms. Papers selected on this basis were then mapped against the
thematic analysis and UoA so creating the matrix at Table 2.3.
The papers are listed in chronological order of publication; where two papers are
published in the same year then date of submission is used to further sort. Where non-
academic papers (e.g. government reports) contributed to the topic, they were included at
the end of the matrix under the heading ‘grey literature.’
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Theme Revolutionary Evolutionary Reactionary
Unit of Analysis P E S T L E P E S T L E -
Maurer, Nelms and Swartz, 2013 X
O’Dwyer and Malone, 2014 X X
Jenssen, 2014 X X
Benet, 2014 X
Swan, 2015 X X X X X X
Wright and De Filippi, 2015 X
Golumbia, 2015 X X X
Zyskind, Nathan and A. S. Pentland, 2015 X X
Dupont and Maurer, 2015 X
R. Dennis and Owen, 2015 X
Dyhrberg, 2016 X
Abramowicz, 2016 X
Yli-Huumo et al., 2016 X X
Yasin and Liu, 2016 X X
Ammous, 2016 X X
Fu and Fang, 2016 X X
Natoli and Gramoli, 2016 X X
Lajoie-Mazenc, 2016 X
Atzori, 2017 X
Allen, 2017 X X X X
Pazaitis, De Filippi and Kostakis, 2017 X X
Yermack, 2017 X X
Beck and Mu¨ller-Bloch, 2017 X X
Risius and Spohrer, 2017 X X X X
Vranken, 2017 X
Nowin´ski and Kozma, 2017 X X
Chapron, 2017 X
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Theme Revolutionary Evolutionary Reactionary
Unit of Analysis P E S T L E P E S T L E -
Porru et al., 2017 X
Sullivan and Burger, 2017 X X
Natoli and Gramoli, 2017 X X
Hsueh and C. T. Chin, 2017 X X
Hwang et al., 2017 X
Wu et al., 2017 X
Velasco, 2017 X X
Pazaitis, De Filippi and Kostakis, 2017 X X
Mathews, Robles and Bowe, 2017 X
Fink, 2017 X X
Werbach and Cornell, 2017 X X
Mengelkamp et al., 2018 X
Kshetri, 2018 X
Aniello et al., 2017 X
Hawlitschek, Notheisen and Teubner, 2018 X
Holub and J. Johnson, 2018 X X X X
Saberi, Kouhizadeh and Sarkis, 2018 X
Reyna et al., 2018 X X
Matzutt et al., 2018 X X
Peterson et al., 2018 X X
Destefanis et al., 2018 X X
Banerjee, 2018 X
Garcia, 2018 X
Angrish et al., 2018 X
B. Wang et al., 2018 X
Chakraborty, Pandey and Rautaray, 2018 X
Juskalian, 2018 X X X
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Theme Revolutionary Evolutionary Reactionary
Unit of Analysis P E S T L E P E S T L E -
Grey literature
Rosenfeld, 2012 X X
McCook, 2014 X
Schwartz, Youngs and Britto, 2014 X
Ross and Sewell, 2015 X
Swanson, 2015a X
Swanson, 2015b X X
Walport, 2016 X X X X X
Weber, 2016 X X
Brown et al., 2016 X
Stro¨bele, Leosk and Trechsel, 2017 X X
V. Gupta, 2017 X X X
Mercy Corps, 2017 X X
Grigg, 2017 X
Maupin, 2017 X X
Holmes, 2017 X X X
Mazet and Wojciechowski, 2017 X
Ernst et al., 2017 X
Catalini and Gans, 2018 X
Greene and Mcdowall, 2018 X
Baird, Harmon and Madsen, 2018 X
Gammar, Ford and Lukasiewicz, 2018 X
Murphy and Wagner, 2018 X X
Table 2.3: Literature review thematic analysis matrix
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2.7 Matrix analysis
Examination of the matrix at Table 2.3, illustrates two phenomena. Firstly the academic
literature is of a more revolutionary bent than the grey. This is unsurprising; grey lit-
erature is produced by industry, government or related institutions (e.g. think-tanks) -
industry profit-maximises and is unlikely to innovate in such a way that their company, or
industry sector, disappears. Similar logic could apply to government - public choice the-
ory suggests that governments are motivated as much by self-preservation as the common
good (Buchanan, 1984, p. 80). Academics meanwhile, although subject to funding and
institutional pressures, have leeway to radically re-imagine all the PESTLE factors. The
second phenomena is chronological: within academia less revolutionary papers appear to
be published over time. This could be confirmation of a previously expressed idea (Figure
2.6): revolutionary concepts are co-opted by established players. However the time-span
of this review is short (due to DLT’s recent emergence), so this conclusion is rudimentary.
If these observations are valid then this could herald DLT breaking with its founder’s
vision. Bitcoin was fundamentally based on disintermediation; the trends above suggest
that the ideas of the central parties are gaining ground. This should not be over-stated
however; partly because this review is not exhaustive (Booth, Sutton and Papaioannou,
2016, p. 21), and partly because of the history of DLT - its most well-known proponent,
Bitcoin, emerged almost entirely outside of government and academic scrutiny; its devel-
opment may well continue in this vein.
Even given the limitations of this review, the matrix clearly demonstrates that DLT
could impact across all areas of PESTLE; each area will now be examined in turn.
2.7.1 Political
Political analysis within the literature has largely focussed on the politics of the block-
chain and cryptocurrencies themselves, likely due to interest in the counter-cultural cypher-
punk movement which gave birth to DLT. Golumbia (2015) posits that Bitcoin is merely
a form of political expression because it is neither a money (as it lacks support of the
state) nor a currency (as it is not useful as a means of exchange). Specifically Golumbia
characterises that expression as “right wing extremism” with elements of anti-semitism.
This analysis, and similar (Maurer, Nelms and Swartz, 2013), is based on online articles
or web forums, a source that is considered compromised for rational debate (Mitchelstein,
2011). The problem though is deeper: in a distributed system where anyone can partake
and the enigmatic creator disappeared; finding a concrete political philosophy that is more
than sweeping cultural analysis, will likely frustrate any academic.
Politics is not just internal to DLT however, DLT could affect how politics is con-
ducted. State research, such as the UK Chief Scientific Officer (Walport, 2016) and the
House of Lords (Holmes, 2017), proposes ‘evolutionary’ uses for DLT: suggesting how
the government improve its offering to citizens. Although such reports veer towards hype
(Artificial Intelligence and Internet of Things being ever present) they also emphasise the
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unglamorous “minimising... costs and redundant work... in administration and back of-
fice operations” (Holmes, 2017) where DLT is best suited. Lord Holmes (2017) refers to
‘algorithmic government’ which rests on authentication (proof you are x), authorisation
(proof you have permission to do x) and accountability (proof that x has completed an ac-
tion). Estonia, Switzerland (Stro¨bele, Leosk and Trechsel, 2017) and the UAE (V. Gupta,
2017) are investigating DLT in e-government initiatives like identity authentication and
online voting. The impact of DLT for government efficiency might be even greater in
developing countries. A Swiss firm, Agora, has trialled voting on the blockchain in Sierra
Leone: to record votes immutably at voting offices to combat corruption (Gammar, Ford
and Lukasiewicz, 2018); while others examine DLT for voter privacy (Zyskind, Nathan
and A. S. Pentland, 2015; B. Wang et al., 2018). DLT has also been used by supranational
organisations, such as United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS, 2018) and
the World Food Programme using DLT to provide identification and payment to refugees
(Juskalian, 2018).
Outside of government the views on DLT can be more ‘revolutionary’ - as Atzori
(2017) asks: with the advent of blockchain is the state still required? Embryonic virtual
states are now emerging; here Estonia leads the way with its e-residency scheme and
partnership with ‘Bitnation’ (Sullivan and Burger, 2017) which styles itself as:
“a decentralized, open-source movement, powered by the Bitcoin blockchain
2.0 technology, in an attempt to foster a peer-to-peer voluntary governance
system, rather than the current ‘top-down’, ‘one-size-fits-all’ model, restrained
by the current nation-state-engineered geographical apartheid, where your
quality of life is defined by where you were arbitrarily born.” (Sullivan and
Burger, 2017)
This truly revolutionary idea is synonymous with the cyberanarchists rejection of
“governments of the industrial world... weary giants of flesh and steel” (Ludlow, 2001,
p. 28) with free-agents instead voluntarily deciding what governance regime they wish
to adopt. This concept pre-dates DLT with Eichenberger and Frey’s (2006) Functional,
Overlapping and Competing Jurisdictions (FOCJ), but one might argue technology is only
now catching up. Sullivan and Burger (2017) provide a practical example with a Spanish
couple using the Estonian e-Residency to register a marriage on the Bitnation blockchain,
thereby stepping outside traditional regulatory routes. They however highlight the ulti-
mate issue - if no territory recognises your Bitnation marriage then what good is it?
Velasco (2017) continues this ‘revolutionary’ stance arguing the fractional-reserve
banking system is a technical device used politically, but that the passing of trust to DLT
brings new forms of politics which current traditional actors of state and market cannot
define. Central to his thesis however is DLT’s economic role, which will be examined
next.
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2.7.2 Economic
Economic research on the earliest DLT, cryptocurrencies, is considerable, covering pos-
itions from how these markets work (Dyhrberg, 2016), to how they do not (Greene and
Mcdowall, 2018), to how they challenge current financial systems (Jenssen, 2014). Re-
search naturally followed to DLT’s role in non-cryptocurrency financial practices, such
as clearing (Schwartz, Youngs and Britto, 2014; Swanson, 2015a; Brown et al., 2016).
The view that DLT can assist in financial markets is not homogeneous: Ammous (2016)
argues Bitcoin is the sole use case for DLT - and that foisting this slow, over-engineered
mechanism elsewhere will prove futile. Much analysis is macroeconomic, the ultimate
expression of this being Bitcoin as a new gold standard which all other currencies are
backed against, although Weber (2016) appraises if this was achieved it would fail for the
same reasons the original did.
At the microeconomic level Beck and Muller-Bloch (2017) present a case study of a
large financial organisation adopting DLT, focusing on the pressure faced by incumbents
whose business model is to act as trusted third parties. Lessons drawn was that motivation
was sparked by curiosity, that DLT specific knowledge had to be bought in (with start-
ups being more competitive) and that adoption lowered intra- and inter-organisational
boundaries. Nowinski and Kozma (2017) add to the microeconomic understanding by
categorising the various business models that DLT could foster from micropayments to
eliminating forgery.
DLT could help all firms, not just those who adopt it, through improved corporate
governance. Yermack (2017) examines how practices such as recording share ownership
using DLT would improve transparency, reduce cost and minimise bad practices such
as “empty voting” where participants acquire shares purely to vote malignantly against
corporations. Ironically though in the short term DLT is allowing governance to be dis-
regarded as firms accumulate capital through Initial Coin Offerings (Catalini and Gans,
2018).
DLT research focuses more on ‘Wall Street’ than ‘Main Street’; but in reviewing sup-
ply chain DLT projects, Kshetri (2018) assesses these are a better fit, as DLT’s strength is
in solving problems of messaging rather than as a database. Wu et al (2017) and Baner-
jee (2018) also propose DLT’s use in supply chain; although both papers may have some
commercial bias: the former features an author from Dow Chemicals who have exper-
imented with DLT and may therefore wish to portray it positively, and the latter from
Infosys - a software vendor seeking to market the technology. A more concrete ‘Main
Street’ example is DLT’s use in manufacturing and construction: Mathews, Robles and
Bowe (2017) argue that the 3D design files are well suited to the immutable nature of DLT,
while Wang et al (2017) propose that DLT’s ability to cross boundaries would help within
construction’s complex leasing arrangements. Angrish et al (2018) best demonstrate the
use of DLT within this field. Here automated machine tools broadcast their availability,
capabilities and performance (as certified by a neutral third party) to a blockchain; whilst
clients requiring manufacturing broadcast digital work packages they need completing
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and prices they are prepared to pay. Smart contracts match supply and demand; so mean-
ing that where previously a company would send work to a few trusted partners, now
this trust cost is reduced they can source from a greater pool. This would be a radical
decentralisation with firms of all sizes being able to fairly compete.
Pazaitis, De Filippi and Kostakis (2017) see DLT as changing the basic fundamentals
of the economy. Their study into ‘Backfeed’ examines an organisation which uses DLT to
form a governance structure allowing individual members to reward each other based on
the size of their contribution to the group. Although one of the authors being an instigator
of Backfeed is likely to have introduced bias, it highlights the potential impact of DLT
on hierarchical structures and associated social interaction. Hawlitschek, Notheisen and
Teubner (2018) alternatively contrast that although DLT can replace trust on a narrow
technical level, it cannot in complex social environments such as the sharing economy
where it is a multilayered concept. Judging then DLT has the potential to impact the
economy multitudinously, what evidence exists it can do so with these social elements -
the next element of this review will examine this.
2.7.3 Social
If DLT can be used to track diamonds (Everledger Ltd, 2017), how about for what So-
crates describes as one’s ‘richest jewel’ - reputation? Dennis and Owens (2015) suggest
DLT could be used for recording a universal reputation score, a key element of much
e-commerce e.g. Ebay, Uber, AirBnB. Decentralising this would mean an end to a com-
pany’s algorithm change eradicating overnight an individual’s reputation, with financially
negative implications in today’s sharing economy; and potentially lower barriers to start-
ups.
Zyskind, Nathan and A. S. Pentland (2015) go further in empowering users and in-
verting the power relationship, by proposing that keys to data shared with companies is
held in a DL, meaning access can be revoked at any time. The authors also propose social
feedback could be added to a DL consensus model with nodes up and down-voted, Fu
and Fang (2016) suggest improvements to this with a ‘Proof-of-Credit’ hybrid-consensus
model; although neither paper provides clear criteria on what determines a good node
from a bad.
Another suggested DLT reputational system involves a comprehensive assessment of a
user (including professional, social, academic, etc) (Yasin and Liu, 2016), this stops short
of Orwellian due to the user granting access rights. It is noteworthy this research is from
a Chinese university, where attitudes to social-media surveillance are markedly different,
as evidenced with the proposed ‘social credit system’ (J. Chin and Wong, 2016). It is not
clear how these systems would not be gamed however - if followers lead to upvotes, what
is to stop reputation inflation by bot? Nevertheless this illustrates that the benefit of DLT
does not exist in a vacuum where only efficiency matters, rather cultural values such as
privacy concerns also determine its use.
Underlying any reputational system is identification - proving to society you are who
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you say. Garcia (2018) addresses this suggesting biometrics coupled with distributed
identifiers could allow government to write identification information to a blockchain, but
then be highly selective as to what data is shared. Caution must be taken when interpreting
this academically-published research however, given Garcia’s employ by a DLT vendor.
The literature therefore coalesces around DLT’s impact on the individual’s relation-
ship with society; there is less on how DLT might change society itself, this mostly
relates to increasing transparency in charitable giving to social enterprises (Mazet and
Wojciechowski, 2017; Mercy Corps, 2017). This limitation may be due to the difficulty
of forecasting how technology changes society, given the complex two-way relationship
between technology and society (Pinch and Bijker, 1993). Although the literature might
be reticent about predictions; DLT is not, with platforms hosting prediction markets where
“reputation tokens” are staked on outcomes (Peterson et al., 2018). If the literature does
not tell us a great deal on technology’s impact on society, the next section will look at
what it tells us about the technology itself.
2.7.4 Technological
As this is a technology under discussion, it is unsurprising the majority of the literature
has focused on technical aspects of DLT (Yli-Huumo et al., 2016; Risius and Spohrer,
2017; Holub and J. Johnson, 2018).
A common theme is DLT design weaknesses. This is to be expected: security and
cryptography move forward by the research community revealing flaws which subsequently
get rectified. An example of this is Natoli and Gramoli (2016)’s examination of how
delays in messaging between nodes in Proof-of-Work blockchains could lead to circum-
stances where double-spend occurs. Research such as this leads to both proposed im-
provements in the systems (Lajoie-Mazenc, 2016; Hsueh and C. T. Chin, 2017) and how
this might impact on real-world enterprise uses, such as the R3 Consortium (Natoli and
Gramoli, 2017).
Although highlighting individual flaws is useful, Porru et al (2017) argue that DLT is
not going to progress without an academic examination of the art and science of develop-
ing these systems which they coin BOSE (Blockchain Oriented Software Engineering).
Similarly, Destefanis et al (2018) evaluates that innovations such as smart contracts and
DAOs can only reach full potential with a specific discipline considering best practices,
testing and design patterns.
The literature also examines how DLT might impact other areas. Within the field of
computer science, DLT applications are proposed in cloud storage (Benet, 2014), operat-
ing systems (Grigg, 2017), artificial intelligence (Murphy and Wagner, 2018) and internet-
of-things (Chakraborty, Pandey and Rautaray, 2018; Reyna et al., 2018); so offering users
the ability to own their identity whilst interacting with the promised “new economy” DLT
heralds (Swan, 2015). DLT’s impact on technology and science may go beyond computer
science - e.g. within medicine FoldingCoin examines how cryptocurrency can incentivise
distributed networks to contribute compute to projects, such as folding proteins (Ross and
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Sewell, 2015).
The technological aspect of the literature reminds us DLT is still emergent. The body
of work is primarily concerned with narrow design issues, although this is changing with
the rise of BOSE as a discipline and consideration how this might cross-fertilise wider
technology and science.
2.7.5 Legal
How a technology relates to the world is much dependent on the legal context. It is thus
important to review the literature that examines where the law and DLT intersect.
DLT’s ‘immutability’ represents a challenge for legal systems - a court order instruct-
ing deletion is unenforceable against a censorship-resistant, decentralised system offering
no method to erase. Fink (2017) argues the European Union’s General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), based on an old world order of centralised data silos, fundament-
ally conflicts with DLT; whilst also believing DLT might contribute to data protection
regulations by providing citizens cryptographic control. GDPR aside, another concern is
illegal content, such as images of child sexual abuse, as Matzutt et al (2018) identifies
on Bitcoin’s blockchain. Depending on legal interpretation this could make all full nodes
illegal, so allowing unscrupulous authorities to clandestinely add illegal data and then ban
Bitcoin use (Colyer, 2018). Moore (2018) however states this is over-emphasised, high-
lighting that illegal content on the blockchain requires considerable processing to make
human-readable, and compares how many dollar bills contain some trace of illegal drugs.
In certain jurisdictions the issue is not how DLT interacts with existing law; but that spe-
cific DL have been declared illegal. Venezuela for instance has banned Bitcoin, which can
be interpreted as a defence to threats of “crypto-secession” (Allen, 2017). Maupin (2017)
criticises these blanket bans; instead jurisdictions should consider the merits of individual
use cases and co-ordinate across borders. Much of this law though applies to permission-
less DLT, particularly cryptocurrency; permissioned DLT, often corporate established, is
less constrained by these rulings.
The relationship between DLT and the law however is not one-way, Wright and De
Filippi (2015) suggest DLT will lead to a reduction in authorities’ control through legal
mechanisms. A subset of law, “lex cryptographia” (Wright and De Filippi, 2015), will
emerge where smart contracts and decentralised autonomous organisations administer
rules agreed by willing participants. Consequently the roles of centralised institutions
as arbiter and notary will diminish (Dupont and Maurer, 2015). Werbach and Cornell
(2017) refute that law is replaceable as it arbitrates when parties disagree - a situation
where inherently inflexible smart contracts fail. This criticism is answered by Abramow-
icz (2016), who demonstrates “tacit coordination games” can decentralise legal judge-
ments. Abramowicz proposes a thought-experiment where a person is offered $10 to
judge whether the next person who the same question is asked of, under the same condi-
tions, will answer whether it is ‘hot’ or ‘cold’; this could be expanded to more nuanced
judgements. The previous barrier to using this decision making mechanism: the require-
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ment of a central party to remunerate winners, could be overcome by smart contracts
leading to “peer-to-peer governance” structures (Abramowicz, 2016).
In summary the literature shows that could DLT face legal challenges as the old world
of centralised authority collides with the new decentralised one, but beyond that the im-
pact might be the disruption of the entire legal system.
2.7.6 Ecological
Given the permissionless nature of the network, estimating Bitcoin energy demand is
not a simple task. One estimate suggests it consumes the same amount of energy as
Ireland: 3 - 6 gigawatts (O’Dwyer and Malone, 2014). More recent studies (Vranken,
2017) estimate less: 0.1 - 0.5 gigawatts. Bitcoin, which uses a Proof-of-Work consensus,
relies on there being a mining cost to prevent a ‘51% attack,’ whereby a malicious party
hijacks the network (Section 2.1); as all currencies entail a production and distribution
cost when this is accounted for some counter that physical cash or gold is actually less
sustainable (McCook, 2014). Although permissionless blockchains typically use PoW,
most permissioned DL use other consensus mechanisms such as Proof-of-Authenticity,
with similar energy cost as typical software.
DLTs impact on energy is far from solely negative - Saberi, Kouhizadeh and Sarkis
(2018) propose its use in product hazard and disposal management through recording in-
formation pertaining to the European Community Directive on Waste Electrical and Elec-
tronic Equipment. Once could envisage a DL, with the Department for the Environment
acting as regulator, which companies are mandated to complete for new products, and to
which recyclers have access at the end of products’ life; so retaining product information
even when the item is no longer manufactured. This scheme would allow stakeholders to
understand both where hazards lie and how scarce resources could best be reclaimed.
This life-cycle provenance could also apply to environmentally sensitive commod-
ities. For example, using DLT to track diamonds, fish and pork allow consumers and
retailers access to the items’ ecological footprint (Chapron, 2017). Coupled with Internet-
of-Things connected devices, information such as storage temperatures could be added for
food safety management.
If this section started with DLT’s electrical use, it is fitting to end with how it might
directly reduce it. Hwang et al. (2017) identifies the use of blockchain in ‘prosumer’
electrical generation, where individuals produce renewable energy. DLT can be used
to sell prosumers’ surplus energy, recording who used what without relying on a central
authority - smart contracts and cryptocurrency can be layered on top to enable autonomous
payments. Reporting on a microgrid utilising DLT in New York, Mengelkamp et al (2018)
views this positively but suggests that real-world application will be constrained by this
being a highly regulated market. RightMesh (Ernst et al., 2017) intend to use DLT and
tokens to incentivise mesh networks allowing subscribers to share their internet access and
be recompensed, especially useful in deprived areas. The use of DLT enabling consumers
to be producers is another example of the revolutionary mindset, upending the traditional
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role of central authority, this time in the guise of big energy.
2.8 Conclusions and implications
The literature shows that DLT has the potential to impact across the entirety of PESTLE;
in many ways radically. Additionally it suggests that with the increasing adoption of DLT
in established institutions, focus is switching to evolutionary from revolutionary.
There is a parallel here too within the technology - whereas the revolutionary can be
seen to equate to Figure 1.1’s early permissionless and public systems, the evolutionary
counterpart is the later permissioned and private. There are implications in this for the
DSN - it is likely that permissioned systems will be the preferred route.
Lord Holmes (2017) has already reached this judgement by advocating permissioned
DLT in government. Permissionless systems require a mechanism to ensure the honesty
of nodes - Bitcoin’s genius is in ensuring this through energy-intensive Proof-of-Work and
on-chain financial incentives. It is difficult to imagine what the equivalence of this would
be with a system designed around the business of the DSN. If the DSN were to use a DLT
which required no permission to join or append information too, how would nodes be
motivated to act in a trustworthy fashion? Likewise a public DSN would put information,
which you might not wish to share with military adversaries, in a public forum.
That is not to rule out using permissionless DLT. Recording hashes of a permissioned
DLT on a permissionless DLT leverages up immutability, referred to as a two-layer block-
chain architecture (Aniello et al., 2017). Alternatively Rosenfeld (2012) propose using
meta-data in a permissionless blockchain to store information standing in for asset own-
ership (so called coloured coins), although this method has critics (Swanson, 2015b).
Additionally newer forms of DLT, such as Hashgraph, a directed acyclic graph using
“permissionless consensus” with “permissioned governance” (Baird, Harmon and Mad-
sen, 2018), might necessitate a reassessment of the basis for judgement.
This dissertation will also primarily examine DLT which enables the share function-
ality of Figure 2.2. Although DLT that enables prove alone is useful in cyber-security, the
efficiencies in the DSN will come through sharing data across organisational boundaries.
However there will be no attempt to select a particular DL, this is a fast moving space and
different use cases will draw on different technological models.
In the same way however that a permissioned DLT that follows the evolutionary path
is more likely to be applicable for the DSN, the methodology of this dissertation will
follow the sociology of regulation approach. This paradigm considers iterative change
rather than root and branch reform, and will be covered in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
3.1 Research paradigm
This dissertation takes a functionalist research paradigm (P. Johnson and Duberley, 2000,
p. 80). That is an objectivist approach (the author is external to the study and is able to
observe the facts in a way that is generalisable) combined with a ‘sociology of regulation’
perspective (that is the study will look to improve the organisation studied, rather than
suggest radical change). The studies philosophical position is that of pragmatism: the
research question of applying a technology to Defence takes centre stage, and concepts
are only relevant when they support this practical aim. The deductive approach is used –
the literature will be studied, followed by suggestions of how DLT might be used within
a defence context. The time horizon will be cross-sectional, that is the study of DSN in
the DLT at this moment, rather than change and development over time (Saunders, Lewis
and Thornhill, 2016, pp. 122-152).
This approach was selected as it matched the Research Question and Aim (Section 1.5)
which was not to establish a radical re-understanding of the DSN or the perception with
which it is held, but rather a practical analysis as to how a technology might be applied. It
is acknowledged that the functionalist approach has limitations, namely its avoidance of
both the role of conflict and the agency of individuals (King, 2011, p. 432-442), however
this was considered less germane to the research in hand.
3.2 Research strategy
A simple form of Action Research is used – the context will be understood, problems
will be identified and solutions will be proposed using the nominated technology. It will
differ from typical Action Research in that proposals will not be implemented and iterated
on; this is due both to time and financial constraints. Given that this study focuses on
understanding problems and providing solutions, potentially having practical relevance to
further MoD work-streams, it falls closer to applied than basic on the research spectrum
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(Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2016, p. 9).
3.3 Data collection
Data was collected using sequential mixed method research (Plano Clark and Ivankova,
2016, p.6). Initial exploratory discussions with individuals was followed by semi-structured
interviews combined with a questionnaire. These were held with two groups of inter-
viewees: those with experience of DLT - primarily from the technology-sector; and those
with knowledge of the DSN, primarily MoD employees. Exploratory discussions were
open interviews enabling contextual data to be gathered and to facilitate further lines of
enquiry. Follow-on semi-structured interviews were then held with experts on DLT and
DSN processes. Semi-structured interviews allowed exploration of interviewees’ insight,
a key requirement for an emerging (and therefore not fully understood) technology. The
questionnaire also acted as a prompt of discussion for qualitative data. Data collection
also occurred through analysis of documentary evidence (Bell, 2014, p. 107), for instance
policy instruction that governs the DSN (e.g. Defence Logistics Framework) and minutes
of various committees (e.g. Defence Logistics Directorate IS Working Group).
Reliability and validity were key concerns throughout data collection; the former be-
ing whether a process produces the same results when duplicated and the latter being
whether the process collects the correct evidence to support the research aim (Bell, 2014,
p. 103-104). Interviews in particular can suffer from problems with reliability, validity
and additionally bias - where either the personal views of the interviewer are introduced
into the process or the interviewee does not provide a true representation of their views
(White and Rayner, 2014, p. 50). Interviewee bias was minimised by explaining the
research was not commercial in nature, offering anonymity and conducting interviews
where participants could not be overheard, so minimising career harm and sales pitches
- see Section 3.4. Interviewer bias was minimised by using videos to explain the techno-
logy, although as discussed in Section 4.2, it was difficult to find a video short enough to
serve as an introduction, yet long enough to provide a balanced view of pros and cons.
The use of videos also increased reliability by ensuring all defence-sector interviewees
were provided with the same base-line DLT information.
Despite this bias was considered a particular problem for technology-sector inter-
viewees. Firstly, company employees are unlikely to disclose criticism of their products
due to potential commercial implications, regardless of whether they are actively trying
to sell. Secondly, being actively involved with a technology and agreeing to an inter-
view focused on such technology suggests a personal belief in DLT which might lead to
over-optimism. Similarly, although effort was made to adopt a neutral stance, the present
researcher’s interest in this dissertation topic could lead to bias in interpreting data col-
lected (Nickerson, 1998). Although this risk was difficult to mitigate, an attempt was
made by encouraging interviewees to discuss negative aspects, as well as seeking out
DLT-critical research.
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Sampling-frame bias, where the selected interviewees constitute a non-representative
sample so leading to an invalid understanding of either DLT or DSN (White and Rayner,
2014, p. 82), was also considered. Defence interviewees were selected for their expertise
in the generic use cases presented in the questionnaire, so enabling assumptions to be
thoroughly questioned. Whereas technology-sector interviewees were selected to gain a
broader understanding of DLT, therefore a variety of organisational types were sought out.
More technology-sector interviewees were interviewed than defence, as the research was
being conducted from a position of experience with the DSN. Table 4.1 illustrates these
points. The research did suffer from a lack of interviewee gender and ethnicity diversity
(Mergaert and Forest, 2015, p. 126), efforts were made to counter this but were frustrated
by dates available for interview; this may have been a consequence of neither the defence
(Ministry of Defence, 2018) nor technology-sector (British Computer Society, 2017) be-
ing exemplars of inclusivity.
Combining qualitative and quantitative data allowed triangulation, so increasing valid-
ity and reliability (Collis and Hussey, 2014, p. 71-72). Reliability was increased by using
a Likert-scale questionnaire, meaning that the another interviewer would have received
the same answers regardless of the particular relationship between interviewer and in-
terviewee. Validity was increased by using semi-structured interviews which allowed a
deeper appreciation of interviewees thought-processes, so allowing an understanding of
why DLT would be applicable to questionnaire use cases; this also provided generalisabil-
ity (Symon and Cassell, 2012, p. 365-366) as this understanding could then be considered
against processes not present in the questionnaire. Feedback on the questionnaire was also
provided by a number of advisors with experimental experience. Ultimately an awareness
of reliability and validity concerns ensured some mitigation, however with a research team
of one this was an inevitable limitation.
Surveys were considered but not used because DLT is an emergent technology and
therefore by definition many will be unfamiliar with it. Surveys are typically used with a
“sizeable population” (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2016, p. 728), yet the number of
people who have understanding of how the technology might be applied to DSN amounts
to a small sample. As this research involves exploring a novel topic, the open ended nature
of interviews afforded this latitude.
3.4 Ethical considerations
The primary ethical concern was causing interviewees ‘career harm’ by publicising opin-
ions which might damage their professional standing. For instance a consultant revealing
that they thought DLT was too immature for business application, might affect their future
employment. Therefore interviewees were offered the options of being identified person-
ally (e.g. Joe Bloggs of IBM), by their employer (e.g. IBM) or anonymity. In this latter
case interviewees would be referred to by the sector they worked for (e.g. ‘a technology
company employee...’). Care was also taken to ensure that interviewees were interviewed
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where they were not overheard by co-workers. All interviewees were given an sequential
number for the purpose of data collection and analyses.
Another ethical concern was conflict of interest. Many interviewees from the tech-
nological sector work for DLT vendors. Data collected would be biased if interviewees
misinterpret the interview as a sales opportunity. Therefore the purpose and nature of the
research was clarified when recruiting candidates. Not only was it clearly stated in the
consent form that all discussions were of non-commercial nature without commitment or
prejudice of the MoD, these were also preambled at the interview.
This research was awarded a Level 2b risk assessment level and authority to proceed
on 20 Sep 17 by the Cranfield University Research Ethics System. MoD Research Ethics
Committee approval was not required.
Chapter 4
Method
Participants were selected from two groups: the technology and defence sectors. The
former were chosen for their knowledge of DLT while the latter for their knowledge of
the DSN. An overlap was foreseen: some technology interviewees might be familiar with
DSN (e.g reservists) and some defence interviewees with DLT (e.g. bitcoin media cover-
age). To capture this, all interviewees reported their familiarity with both DSN and DLT
on a five point Likert scale as shown in Figure 4.1.
Ten semi-structured face-to-face interviews were conducted with technology inter-
viewees and six with defence (with an in-depth exploratory interview being conducted
with one interviewee from each sector prior to this to establish a research direction). In-
terviews took place at the interviewees’ workplace or at a mutually convenient location
(e.g. cafe), locations where chosen to ensure interviewees could hear the videos clearly
and were not overhead by co-workers . Interviews typically lasted 45 minutes to one hour.
Technology and defence interviews followed different formats.
4.1 Technology-sector interviewees
Participants were selected in two ways. Social networking within the MoD enterprise,
trade events (e.g. Team Defence Information) and the MoD intranet were used to identify
companies with an ongoing relationship with the MoD and an interest in DLT. Companies
were then approached and asked if any of their employees would be willing to be inter-
viewed. Secondly interviewees were also recruited by asking at the end of an interview
for additional contacts who would be willing to participate. Typically, but not always, the
former method led to interviewees from established technology companies, and the latter
to start-ups.
The format used for all interviewees from the technology-sector was:
1. Introduction to research and consent approval
2. Overview of DSN
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Figure 4.1: Defence vs technology-sector interviewees self-reported familiarity with DLT
and DSN (Author’s own work)
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3. Discussion of company technology or organisational interest
4. Interviewee completes questionnaire - discussing with interviewee throughout
5. Exploration of further defence use cases
6. Discussion of further avenues of research (either people, organisations or literature)
Item 2, the overview of the DSN, was brief and featured an oral introduction similar
to that provided in Section 1.4. Typically all interviewees had some knowledge (first-
hand or otherwise) of supply chains, so this concept was easily relatable. Figure 4.1
shows that technology-sector interviewees reported greater knowledge of the DSN, than
defence-sector of DLT.
4.2 Defence-sector interviewees
Interviewees from the defence-sector (i.e. chosen for their knowledge of defence pro-
cesses) were selected from networking within the enterprise and the MoD intranet. While
technology interviewees were selected from a wide pool, with any organisation that had
a DLT undertaking considered admissible; Defence employees were selected on the basis
of expertise in one of the generic use cases at Appendix A.
The defence interview format differs from the technology-sector in replacing the in-
troduction to DSN with DLT:
1. Introduction to research consent approval
2. Discussion of role of interviewee
3. Introduction to DLT
4. Interviewee completes questionnaire - discussing with interviewer throughout
5. Exploration of further defence use cases
6. Discussion of further avenues of research (either people, organisations or literature)
Interviewees were introduced to DLT through two short videos. Showing videos rather
than reading a script helped prevent the researcher showing positive bias unconsciously
(e.g. via tone of voice), whilst at the time ensuring consistency. Illustrating the relev-
ant underlying concepts visually (for example animation of the chaining of data blocks)
helped explain complicated concepts to those without an Information Systems (IS) back-
ground. Videos might also make what was potentially a dry subject more interesting
compared to reading or listening to a monotone script.
The videos were selected from YouTube. The search term “blockchain introduction”
was used and the resulted videos were sorted by YouTube ascribed ‘relevance.’ Videos
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longer than 10 minutes were excluded. The resulting list was reviewed in order of relev-
ance. Videos with poor audio, graphics and non-professional delivery were discounted.
Remaining videos were checked for user-comments related to usefulness in explaining
the technology to those previously unfamiliar with DLT before being given a researcher
ascribed rating. This process was repeated using the search term “distributed ledger tech-
nology introduction.” In total nineteen videos were given ratings.
Following review it was decided that no single video sufficiently explained both the
technology itself and applications of the technology, necessitating the selection of two.
The video selected to explain the technology was produced by the UK Government Of-
fice for Science (GO-Science, 2016) and accompanied the Walport (2016) report; which
although providing a good grounding in the technology concentrated more on finance -
potentially leading defence-sector interviewees to think DLT had little relevance to the
DSN. The second video therefore selected was an IBM (2016) demonstration of how the
blockchain might be used in the car industry. Choosing this video did risk interviewees
being influenced by their attitude towards IBM; however it was felt that the IBM video
provided a far superior explanation on how the technology might be applied in a DSN-
like environment. Thus effort was made to reiterate that many vendors offer this tech-
nology besides IBM, and the Government video was shown first. The videos last 5 min
15 seconds and 3 minutes respectively. Interviewees had an opportunity to ask questions
after watching - however typically interviewees reported that the videos had provided a
satisfactory overview of DLT.
One risk that it was difficult to mitigate against was giving an overly positive im-
pression of DLT. Introductory videos by definition do not cover critical detail; this was
especially the case in the IBM clip (a DLT vendor). An attempt at balance was made
by explaining that this was an emergent technology with few real world use cases. Ul-
timately this trade off was accepted to ensure defence-sector interviewees had a basic
understanding of DLT.
4.3 Questionnaire
Both industry and Defence interviewees completed the same questionnaire, featuring the
use cases at Appendix A. These four generic DSN use cases had been selected following
an initial review of the literature, and were: Codification, Revenue & Customs, Engin-
eering & Asset Management and Contracting for Availability. Questionnaires were struc-
tured as follows: a description of the four potential use cases, questions on familiarity
with DSN and DLT, questions on utility and ease of implementation of each use case and
questions on confidence in answers provided. All operative words were defined at the
start of the questionnaire. All questions were answered using a Likert-scale rating of one
to five. Where one represented not at all useful, very difficult or not at all confident; five:
very useful, very easy or very confident. Although interviewees were asked to rate how
confident they felt in rating each use case (e.g. I am very confident that Use Case A is
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very easy to implement), in the final analysis this confidence data was not used as it added
little value, partly due to its self reported nature.
Interviewees were encouraged to read all use cases prior to answering the questions -
this was to ensure they were able to compare use cases as they responded. A discussion
on the strengths and weaknesses of the use cases would normally take place as the ques-
tionnaire was completed, notes were taken by the interviewer and recorded via dictaphone
with interviewees’ consent.
An open discussion followed the questionnaire, bringing out further issues with the
use cases and exploring other use cases not covered in the questionnaire.
Table 4.1 lists semi-structured interviewees. Sector was defined by expertise not or-
ganisation. For instance on 1 Feb a MoD employee was interviewed who contracted DLT
pilot projects; they were defined as tech-sector as the knowledge they were bringing to the
research was of DLT. One interviewee listed in Table 4.1, although providing qualitative
data, declined to answer the questionnaire - this was due to the ambiguity inherent in the
term DLT and the variety of solutions that might be applied to each use case. Although
further clarification was provided by email after the interview, the interviewee did not
follow up.
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Date Sector Location Organisational Type Reason for interview
26 Sep 17 Tech London Consultancy DLT engineering use cases
26 Sep 17 Tech London Consultancy DLT engineering use cases
5 Oct 17 Tech London Think tank DLT finance use cases
28 Nov 17 Tech London Technology start-up DLT supply chain use cases
11 Dec 17 Tech London Technology start-up DLT supply chain use cases
11 Dec 17 Tech London Consultancy DLT generic use cases
1 Feb 18 Tech London MoD Information Systems & Services DLT defence use cases
2 Feb 18 Tech Hampshire Technology corporate (large cap) DLT public sector use cases
9 Feb 18 Defence Portsmouth Navy Command Headquarters CfA & E&AM expertise
19 Mar 18 Defence Bristol DE&S Delivery Team CfA & E&AM expertise
11 Apr 18 Tech Bristol Engineering corporate (large cap) DLT defence use cases
24 Apr 18 Defence Bristol DE&S Delivery Team Customs expertise
24 Apr 18 Defence Bristol DE&S Delivery Team Customs expertise
10 May 18 Defence Bristol UK National Codification Bureau Codification expertise
16 May 18 Tech Hampshire Technology private company DLT private sector use cases
5 Jun 18 Defence Portsmouth Defence corporate (large cap) CfA & E&AM expertise
Table 4.1: Semi-structured interviews
Chapter 5
Discussion
5.1 Extant evaluation frameworks
Lord Holmes (2017), identified that although it is easy to find inefficient processes within
government to serve as use cases, constructing viable DLT business cases would prove
much harder. Indeed an initial exploratory discussion with a technologist in a global IT
company identified that a standard process to determine the validity and utility of use
cases should be a pre-condition of any research into DLT. This led to Research Objective
3 (Section 1.5):
To create a framework for evaluating the utility of DLT against use cases,
drawing from relevant academic or business models.
A framework groups conceptual elements making general assertions and identifying
key features on a relevant subject, in this case the utility of the application of DLT to DSN
business processes; it differs from a theory in that is not sufficient to perform hypothesis-
testing research (Anderson, 2014, p. 2). By designing such a framework, this research
adds value by enabling others to assess DLT DSN use cases against a standard process, or
at least provide the basis for such a process.
Extant frameworks were reviewed to determine relevant elements for the proposed
framework. Frameworks considered were generic technology frameworks that looked at
the application of technology to an enterprise, and DLT-specific frameworks (divided into
those originating from academia versus commerce).
5.1.1 Generic technology evaluation frameworks
A number of academic models explore a technology’s utility within a business process.
Unfortunately from the perspective of this dissertation many of these models do not exam-
ine a technology directly, but rather users’ perception of the technology. For instance the
Technology Acceptance Model (F. D. Davis, 1989) claims to be a “robust, powerful, and
45
46 CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION
Figure 5.1: Task Technology Fit (Goodhue and Thompson, 1995)
parsimonious model for predicting user acceptance” but acts through subjective questions,
such as “people who are important to me think that I should use the system” (Venkatesh
and F. D. Davis, 2000) without assessing the technology itself. Likewise the Expectation-
Confirmation Model uses consumer research to elicit similar findings, namely that users
will accept a system if satisfied, and will be satisfied if it conforms to their expectations
of utility (Bhattacherjee, 2001). Resultantly this ‘soft’ social-science approach is diffi-
cult to use practically when analysing an emerging technology prior to adoption. At the
heart of this difficulty is that IS is an amalgam of technology, people and processes (Stair
and Reynolds, 2012, p. 12) so attempting to analyse one of these factors in isolation is
difficult, particularly when software itself is abstract (Dijkstra, 1989).
The literature also looks at adoption within organisations, covering the concepts of
technology diffusion (how widely technology is used in an organisation) and infusion
(how deeply technology permeates an organisation). Studies have been conduced using
the Technology-Organization-Environment (TOE) framework to measure this (Zhu and
Kraemer, 2005). Again however this is of limited benefit in the scenario where existing
business processes are being mapped against an emergent technology.
One academic model that does have relevance though is Task Technology Fit (TTF)
theory. TTF predicts that the impact on performance of a team will only be positive when
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the technology introduced meets the requirements of the team’s task (Goodhue, 1995).
Studies of TTF (Fuller and A. R. Dennis, 2009) confirm the better the fit of the techno-
logy, the higher the initial performance of the team; expressed both in effectiveness (e.g.
quality) and efficiency (e.g. time/cost). There are three primary antecedents influencing
this fit, as illustrated at Figure 5.1, and expanded below:
1. Task. The actions conducted by individuals to transform inputs into outputs for the
purposes of achieving a goal.
2. Technology. The tools used by individuals to accomplish the task. In the TTF
context this refers to IS; which cover policies, training, etc, as well as the IT itself.
3. Individual. Those using the tools to complete the actions required; influenced by
their own specific characteristics (e.g. motivation).
Therefore TTF measures how a technology aids individuals in completing their tasks.
As Figure 5.1 shows TTF is not the only determinant of performance, ‘utilisation’ also
matters which is influenced by attitudes, which is beyond the scope of this research. TTF
is a static model, when teams develop familiarity with IS they are used differently to the
designer’s intent - the Fit Appropriation Model (Fuller and A. R. Dennis, 2009) considers
this, but again is outside research scope.
Although not all the TTF factors are relevant to an assessment of DLT (for instance
how reliable are the systems), Goodhue and Thompson (1995) list some that are:
1. Task Equivocality
(a) ADHC1 — I frequently deal with ill-defined business problems.
(b) ADHC2 — I frequently deal with ad-hoc, non-routine business problems.
(c) ADHC3 — Frequently the business problems I work on involve answering
questions that have never been asked in quite that form before.
2. Task Interdependence
(a) INTR1 — The business problems I deal with frequently involve more than
one business function.
(b) INTR2 — The problems I deal with frequently involve more than one business
function.
Task equivocality could be seen to negatively correlate with the utility of DLT. Ulti-
mately a distributed ledger is a form of database, and architectural decisions have to be
made as to what information a database captures. The more ill-defined the problem, the
less certain we are that the right data is being captured or processed correctly, and the less
useful the ledger will be in providing answers. On the other hand task interdependence
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may positively correlate with the utility of DLT - after all a database able to cover more
than one business unit is exactly what is meant by “distributed.”
The literature also refers to more specific use case analysis tools such as Critical Suc-
cess Factors (CSF) (Sebora, S. M. Lee and Sukasame, 2009; Chow and On Ha, 2009) and
Feasibility Analysis (Stair and Reynolds, 2012, p. 518). CSF are those key elements that
an enterprise must do well when implementing a technology to ensure success, which al-
though useful, does not assist in actually selecting use cases, and typically requires a num-
ber of implemented use cases to study before CSF can be elicited. Feasibility Analysis
meanwhile tends to be a process where factors like Return on Investment are considered
by an enterprise - but only once a use case has been selected. Technology Readiness
Levels (Mankins, 2009), although initially promising due to their emphasis on emerging
technology, were discounted due to the difficulty of using it with such a broadly defined
technology. Correspondingly these tools were not used in constructing a framework.
5.1.2 DLT-specific evaluation frameworks
Turning from the more overarching literature of generic technology adoption, next DLT-
specific papers were reviewed for assistance in designing an evaluation framework. Ex-
amples of these can be found both within the academic literature, and as might be expected
from commercial vendors seeking to sell DLT-based products.
Commercial DLT evaluation frameworks
Clearly the profit seeking imperative should be considered when weighing commercial
DLT evaluation Frameworks; vendors are ultimately looking to sell products. But they
should not be discounted due to this: during one interview an industry representative
ventured that they were taking great pains to ensure that appropriate projects were chosen
for DLT - as the technology is so new failures at this stage might poison adoption for a
considerable period.
Multichain, a DLT vendor, is specific about this point with their blog post entitled
“Avoiding the pointless blockchain project” (Greenspan, 2015). Here they readily admit
that DLT is, from a readiness standpoint, still in “diapers” and lays out a number of needed
conditions where DLT should be used in preference to a standard database:
• The database. Ultimately a DLT is a structured repository for information, there-
fore an enterprise needs to know why they are using a database - in the same way
they would for any other store of information.
• Multiple writers. The above database needs to be modified by more than one
entity. In most cases, but not all, the writers will also keep a copy of the database
themselves (i.e. run their own node).
• Absence of trust. An absence of trust must exist between the multiple entities
specified above. Greenspan usefully expands this by explaining that mistrust can
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Figure 5.2: Characteristics of high-potential use cases (Mulligan et al., 2018)
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exist within an organisation (i.e. between business units) and can be expressed as
reluctance to let one entity modify database entities which another one “owns.”
• Disintermediation. Amongst the multiple entities, who mistrust each other, there
should be no “trusted intermediary.” That is a central gatekeeper who all parties
trust and can verify and authenticate transactions.
• Transaction interaction. Transactions need to cross the boundaries of several or-
ganisational boundaries. In other words there need to be situations of the sort where
Alice’s bank passes £1 to Bob’s bank, who then loans that £1 to Charlie’s bank. If
the ledger is simply being used to record Alice’s balance, and no one else’s, then
DLT makes little sense.
Although written with the aim of selling a proprietary DLT-product, this is a useful
summary of where enterprises should seek to adopt DLT. Greenspan’s approach is valid-
ated by the adoption of these principles by Rodrigues, Bockek and Stiller (2018) and the
World Economic Forum (Mulligan et al., 2018) (although the latter without attribution,
so it is possible they have been formulated independently) as at Figure 5.2.
Multichain is not alone in providing advice as to where firms should look to adopt
DLT; established firms are providing similar advice in a consultancy role. In contrast
to the above which is technically orientated, much of this consultancy advice is more
focussed on business use cases; Table 5.1 is an example of this form of advice, comparing
the criteria that IBM, SAP and Oracle suggest customers consider when adopting DLT.
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Factor IBM SAP Oracle
Multiparty Do we need to track transactions
that involve more than two Parties?
Multiparty collaboration: Are
many different parties, and not just
one, involved in the process or
scenario, but one party dominates
everything? For example, a
company with many parties in the
ecosystem that are all connected to
it but not in a network or more
decentralized structure.
Is my business process
pre-dominantly cross-departmental
/ cross-organisational?
Auditability Can the network benefit from
increased trust, transparency, and
accountability in recordkeeping?
Transparency and auditability: Is it
important to offer each party
transparency (e.g., on the origin,
delivery, geolocation, and
hand-overs) and auditable steps?
(e.g., How can I be sure that the
wine in my bottle really is from
Bordeaux?)
Is there a need to improve
traceability or audit trail?
Manual
process
Is the current system prone to
errors due to manual processes or
duplication of effort?
Process optimization: Will
blockchain massively improve a
process that today is performed
manually, involves multiple parties,
needs to be digitized, and is very
cumbersome to manage or be part
of?
Can I improve business process by
automating certain steps in it?
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Intermediary Is the current system overly
complex or costly, possibly due to
the need for intermediaries or a
central point of control?
- Does it involve intermediaries,
possibly corruptible?
Trust Does my business network need to
manage contractual relationships?
- Is there a trust issue among
transacting parties?
Fraud Is the current transaction system
vulnerable to fraud, cyber-attack,
and human error?
Risk and fraud minimization: Does
it help (or is there a need) to
minimize risk and fraud for each
party, or at least for most of them
in the chain? (e.g., A company
might want to know if its goods
have suffered any shocks in transit
or whether the predefined route
was not followed.)
-
Periodicity - - Does it require periodic
reconciliations?
Visibility - - Do we need real time visibility of
the current state of the transaction?
Table 5.1: Comparison of IBM (M. Gupta, 2017, p. 37), SAP (Roehricht, 2017)
and Oracle (Abiodun and Goel, 2017) DLT use case adoption criteria
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Table 5.1 shows that the vendors’ advice has common themes. It is possible that this
is simple plagiarism; no company claiming to be at the forefront of technology would
want to miss out on the next wave of innovation. However this seems unlikely as a sole
explanation considering the investment these firms made, for instance IBM has donated
44,000 lines of code to an open-source DLT (Borek, 2016).
Assuming that this commonality exists because these are genuine areas where DLT
might engage, how does this compare against the DSN? More specifically, considering
that Research Objective 2 (Section 1.5) covers what challenges the DSN faces, this next
section will consider these adoption criteria in light of these challenges.
DSN challenges addressed by commercial DLT adoption criteria
Multiparty The DSN can be viewed as multiparty both externally and internally. As
illustrated in Figure 1.2, the DSN relies upon a network of external parties - equipment
and items are purchased from, maintained and calibrated and subsequently disposed of by
industry. These are not merely external touch points - the use of contractors embedded on
operations, for repair and resupply, has increased steadily since the 1990s as part of the
‘Whole Force’ concept (Uttley, 2005, p. 9). An example of such extensive arrangements
is the UK Military Flying Training System (MFTS); here DE&S use both industry equip-
ment and personnel in a Private Finance Initiative to train armed forces aircrew (Ministry
of Defence, 2016, p. 37). Despite the depth of industry links, the MoD has been criti-
cised for failing to manage its contracts proficiently. The Public Accounts Committee
noted that the MFTS contract was late, over-budget and underperforming; a key reason
being that data to manage the contract was unavailable as it was “held in pockets within
the Department, and is not routinely analysed” (Parliament. House of Commons, 2015,
p. 14-16).
The other element of multiparty is the internal element, as Oracle comments not all
DLT members have to be external. Again an area that the DSN struggles with; Fig-
ure 5.3 illustrates what the National Audit Office (2006) described as “complex inter-
relationships” in Bowman procurement which contributed to the failure of the project.
Beck and Muller-Bloch (2017)’s case study of a firm that did adopt DLT found that both
intra- and inter-organisational boundaries faded due to the decentralised nature of data
sharing - this could therefore benefit the DSN whose very definition is as a “flexible set
of [...] connecting points [and] linked nodes” (Ministry of Defence, 2015b, p. 9).
The DSN can therefore be seen as a multiparty enterprise - internally due to its fed-
erated nature and externally due to its relationship to suppliers. SAP in their blockchain
adoption advice recommends that one party dominates this multiparty arrangement - pos-
sibly because the dominant player might be able to influence others to adopt a new tech-
nology. This would fit well with the MoD - it is often a major client of suppliers and
consequently is in a position to influence them. Thus the multiparty factor of DLT adop-
tion could apply to the DSN; so helping MoD overcome its challenges with sharing data
over organisational boundaries.
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Figure 5.3: Bowman radio procurement stakeholders (Parliament. House of Commons,
2006)
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Auditability The next factor that all three vendors agree on is that of auditability. When
one considers the criticality of equipment (e.g. armaments, medical, radiological items)
that makes up the DSN, this is a key requirement. An example can be taken from the
Haddon-Cave report into the mid-air explosion of a Nimrod surveillance aircraft over
Afghanistan with the loss of 14 lives. This report tracks the procurement of a rubber seal
that was the likely cause of the fuel leak responsible. This had been sold by the manufac-
turer for £15, and after having passed through two subsequent sub-contractors, was even-
tually procured by Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S) for £123.50 (Haddon-Cave,
2006, p. 101-102). DE&S assumed at this cost it meant they were procuring the item
from an “accredited aviation supplier” however neither the manufacturer nor anyone else
in the procurement chain were performing any quality control. This issue might be ameli-
orated by a DLT, as interviews with technologists involved with the automotive industry
revealed. If DE&S implemented a system whereby any party who was supplying air-
worthiness items had to log dates of manufacture and identifying batch or serial numbers
on a blockchain; then any quality checks performed either by the original equipment man-
ufacturer or a third party could also be logged against that item on the same blockchain.
Signatures using public-private key encryption would ensure the quality control was only
conducted by authorised parties. Although this would still leave the digital-physical gap
(i.e. how can one be sure the item in the blockchain is the same as the item in hand) it
would help in ensuring the provenance of items where many layers of sub-contractors are
involved. Auditability could therefore be a strong driver for DSN adoption of DLT.
Manual Processes All three vendors agree that adopting companies should look to DLT
to replace manual processes, specifically where those manual processes introduce errors.
This is a factor that is also identified by Lord Holmes (2017) arguing that both the health
sector and real estate markets suffer from excessive manual reconciliation which could
be eradicated by DLT. This problem also exists in the DSN however, as illustrated by the
NAO while investigating the MoD’s Logistics Information Systems (Parliament. House of
Commons, 2011). Process mapping the delivery of a single item to Afghanistan the NAO
found data of its movement recorded on four different systems. To allow full visibility of
the consignment the data had to be transferred manually, involving portable hard drives
and re-keying, thus is error prone.. Although the situation since 2011 has improved, with
the limited introduction of some new Log IS, many examples of manual reconciliation
still exist. However the existence of a manual process in itself is not a strong driver to
DLT specifically - the basic premise of almost all IS is that they take an unstructured
process and automate it, in the process reaping productivity gains (Davenport and Short,
1990). This particular use case criteria might therefore be best considered not as a single
driver, but one to be taken in consultation with others: when looking for potential DLT
use cases a logical starting point are ones that currently have a large proportion of manual
effort.
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Intermediary The next criteria is not universal: SAP and Oracle highlight the role
of intermediaries, while IBM does not. The role of intermediaries is also highlighted
in Greenspan’s (2015) analysis; this is not surprising, one of DLT’s founding principles
was to removes intermediaries, in the case of bitcoin the banks. This criteria does not
necessarily map across to the DSN because the MoD often plays the role of Greenspan’s
“trusted intermediary”, with the MoD often playing an outsized role in arrangements
between it and its suppliers. It does not necessarily mean there are no aspects to explore
here - one avenue might be a potential ‘disintermediation’ of roles the MoD plays. For
instance the role of the United Kingdom National Codification Bureau (UKNCB) is to
assign NATO Stock Numbers (NSN) on behalf of the UK to items procured by the MoD.
But as the majority of the item information is supplied and updated by the manufacturer,
it might be more efficient for the MoD and manufacturer to simply share a DL; this use
case will be further discussed in Section 5.4.1. Thus disintermediation could therefore be
an internal effect.
Although the MoD may play an outsized role with its own suppliers, this does not
apply in coalition where the DSN works alongside other nations; as key element in DSN
doctrine, as illustrated at Figure 1.2. An example here is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF) project where equipment is shared between a multinational alliance of twelve coun-
tries. Each time repairable JSF equipment is transferred between nations it is accompan-
ied by an Electronic Equipment Logbook (EEL) which shows all maintenance performed
on that item. There has been criticism of how this is handled within the JSF’s Autonomic
Logistics Information System (ALIS) (Behler, 2018, p. 53), potentially using a distributed
system to record and share this information might be more effective. As ALIS has also
been criticised for inappropriately sharing sensitive data (Seidel, 2017) a DL could also
have the advantage of giving nations more granularity over data to be shared (e.g. a nation
would share what maintenance was conducted, but might redact where that maintenance
was conducted). Consideration though should be given to whether a standard relational
database might be more efficient, which is possible with an agreed central authority to
trust; trust being the subject of the next criteria.
Trust Trust is not mentioned by all vendors. Oracle mentions it explicitly, while IBM’s
reference is implicit in referencing contractual relationships. As discussed the DSN relies
heavily on contractual relationships; this research discovered trust issues here, particularly
involving Contracting for Availability (CfA) - which is where the MoD pays a contractor
for performance of a platform (e.g. days a ship is available for tasking) rather than for
the equipment outright (Caldwell and Howard, 2014). One MoD interviewee reported fre-
quently disagreements with industry when reviewing CfA performance indicators because
both parties believed their own data more reliable. Echoes of this can be found in official
publications, for instance NAO’s assessment of the MoD’s current equipment plan raises
“significant risk around ... the quality of contractor data” (Parliament. House of Com-
mons, 2017b). Trust issues over contractor data therefore have room for improvement,
meaning that the DSN meets this criteria for DLT adoption.
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Fraud IBM and SAP both list fraud minimisation as reasons to adopt DLT; although
this is a wide category, with IBM including cyber-attack and human error, and SAP a
more general ‘risk.’ Oracle although not specifically having a fraud criteria refers previ-
ously to ‘corruptible’ intermediaries. Given the sums of money involved in the DSN it is
perhaps not surprising that contractor misconduct does occur - forty-four allegations of
bribery and corruption involving the equipment budget were made by the MoD between
2011 and 2016 (Press Association, 2016). Similarly the Single Source Regulations Office
(2016) stated that £61 million charged by DE&S contractors may be for “costs that are
not appropriate, attributable and reasonable.” This is a criteria that again fits the DSN.
Fraud within the DSN is not limited to financial matters such as inflated costs, it can also
have a physical impact such as with the supply of counterfeits. Indeed, 15% of spare
and replacement semiconductors procured by the US military are estimated to be coun-
terfeit (Semiconductor Industry Association, 2013). Within a defence context counterfeit
products raise not only operational issues, due to reliability and quality concerns from
unscrupulous sub-contractors using fake items to reduce costs; but also cyber-security
risks - counterfeit electrical items can be an attack vector for hostile nation states. As
defence equipment becomes ever more complicated and reliant on contractors, this is a
growing problem (Barnas, 2016). Hsieh and Ravich (2017) directly address this problem
in their analysis of how DLT might be used to protect the Industrial Base from Supply
Chain attacks. They propose that contractors and sub-contractors involved in the manu-
facture of complex systems are provided with accounts on a blockchain and payment is
only rendered when a prime or sub-contractor records value-adding activity on this chain.
Data analytics performed on this chain would then highlight anomalies where bad act-
ors (i.e. front companies) might have opportunity to supply counterfeits. Although this
is a bold vision, there are considerable challenges, for instance influencing all the sub-
contractors to join the chain. Either way fraud is certainly a criteria where DSN and DLT
might interact.
Periodicity and Visibility Only one vendor, Oracle, provide periodicity and visibility
as a criteria within Table 5.1. Both are tangential to DLT implementation - many sys-
tems provide real time visibility and are periodically reconciled. Thus these criteria are
excluded from the proposed evaluation framework.
Academic DLT evaluation frameworks
Having examined a sub-set of commercial advice as to when DLT should be adopted and
how this might address DLT challenges; the academic literature will now be reviewed.
This is far less focussed, than the commercial publications, on the solving of particular
business problems. Rather academia focuses on the technical aspects of implementation,
this is borne out by previous DLT literature reviews (Yli-Huumo et al., 2016; Risius and
Spohrer, 2017). Subsequently these frameworks, unlike the vendor supplied ones, will
not be compared to the challenges the DSN faces (Research Objective 2, Section 1.5).
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Figure 5.4: Peck’s (2017b) blockchain adoption decision flowchart
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Figure 5.5: Wust & Gervais’ (2017) blockchain adoption decision flowchart
Peck (2017b) provides a decision tree to assist enterprises to decide if they require a
blockchain, and if so, whether public or permissioned, as at Figure 5.4 (NB - Peck is a
journalist, but as she is writing in a technical journal this will be assessed as academic
literature). Of the seven possible paths a user might take through the tree; four result
in not needing a blockchain, two in a permissioned blockchain and only one in a pub-
lic blockchain. The pathways that lead to DLT adoption are based around censorship
resistance and universal access; while if speed, cost, speed, predictability or privacy are
important Peck believes you should avoid blockchain. The logic behind this is unclear, if
not actually circular. If the user answers the starting question, “Can a traditional database
technology meet your needs?”, negatively; the user will still be redirected to the default
of “You don’t need a blockchain.” But in this case what solution is Peck proposing for the
enterprise - a non-Computer Based IS (e.g. a filing cabinet)? Alternatively maybe Peck is
assuming that a “no” to the traditional database question might be the wrong answer - in
which case the user should be redirected to the traditional solution; however if you cannot
rely on reliable answers the decision tree concept is flawed.
Wust & Gervais’ (2017) provide a more precise decision tree at Figure 5.5 than Peck
(2017b), with the initial question regards storing state usefully focussing on concepts
rather than specific technologies. With this version four out of seven paths lead to “don’t
use blockchain,” and singular paths lead to private permissioned, public permissioned
and permissionless respectively. One of their key decision points, as highlighted by the
industry criteria, revolves around trust. Here trust is defined as assuming “no participant
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is malicious”; this is a far stricter definition than expressed by industry, Greenspan (2015)
for instance believing mistrust could exist within the same organisation when one unit
was unwilling to let another modify its data. Of particular relevance to this research is the
authors’ scepticism over supply-chain management DLT because of the digital-physical
gap, or the difficulty of confirming the object that exists on-chain matches that in reality;
potential solutions to their criticisms are examined in Section 5.5.1.
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Figure 5.6: World Economic Forum’s (Mulligan et al., 2018) blockchain adoption decision flowchart
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One of the more authoritative decision trees is published by the World Economic
Forum at Figure 5.6, which is adopted from an earlier academic model (Maull et al.,
2017). This decision tree is the most sophisticated reviewed with extensive descriptions
of decision points and worked examples. However there are contradictions: the first step
asks “are you trying to remove intermediaries or brokers?” yet the use case features an
imaging company where “the intermediaries are actually the boundaries of the firm that
currently hold the GPU computational capacity for rendering images.” It is difficult to
imagine a firm without boundaries - which effectively means that all firms could answer
‘yes’ to the first question. This does not detract from the use case (which is similar to
Angrish et al.’s (2018) cybermanufacturing example), but does illustrate that an inflexible
process to decide where DLT may fit, is unsuited to fluidly-defined DLT.
The academic world is therefore more reticent to propose DLT as a solution for busi-
ness problems than the commercial one. There are a number of possible reasons - the
first and most obvious being the lack of commercial incentive. However, established
companies such as IBM, SAP and Oracle are likely to prefer long-standing business rela-
tionships over short term gain over; they also potentially have more practical insight into
business problems than academics. A more subtle problem might be the “not invented
here” syndrome (Antons and Piller, 2015). Narayanan and Clark (2017) comment that
although Nakamoto’s white paper was more novel than typical academic research, it was
ignored by academia initially because of Nakamoto’s rejection of academic norms such
as peer-review. Furthermore they critique that many academics continued to argue that
theoretically Bitcoin could not work, even when the reality contradicted this. Though this
can only be taken so far - as the literature review shows, many academics are engaging
with DLT. Lastly the divergence of views might be explained by the difficulty of defining
DLT; as discussed there is not yet a standard definition of DLT. As Peck (2017a) admits
elsewhere, DLT is like the parable of three blind people describing an elephant: “one per-
son feels the leg and it’s a tree trunk, another person feels the side of the elephant and it’s
a wall, and a third person feels the trunk and it’s a snake.” Regardless of reason consid-
erable difference exists over when DLT should be applied to processes and when not, and
in truth only its practical application will tell.
5.2 An evaluation framework for DSN
Synthesising this elephant into one framework for evaluating DSN use cases is therefore
difficult. However it is worthwhile; given the DSN’s scope this research cannot cover all
possible use cases, but it can contribute by designing a framework which can be used to
shortlist use cases for development (Research Objective 3, Section 1.5).
A decision tree, following the examples in Section 5.1.2, was considered, but rejected.
As Mulligan et al. (2018) inadvertently demonstrated ‘yes’ or ‘no’ questions can lead to
contortions when valid use cases do not conform to a pre-designed question set; not helped
by DLT being so widely-defined. Rather an analogue approach is required which rates use
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cases on a spectrum of DLT adaptability.
Inspired by the Gartner Magic Quadrant series of data representation (Whitehorn,
2007), the proposed framework takes the form of a plotted chart and is a visual aid. Util-
ity and ease of implementation form the two axes. Use cases are plotted against these
axes and are represented by a point whose size corresponds with the impact of the use
case on the IS landscape of the organisation. The definition of the terms utility, ease of
implementation and impact are:
Utility. The benefit to the enterprise of applying DLT to a use case - this metric recognises
that some processes are more suited to DLT-adoption than others.
Ease of implementation. Although there might be utility in applying DLT to a process,
this recognises that the business change required may be difficult or require sub-
stantial resources.
Impact. The size of the change this will have on the IS landscape of the enterprise as a
whole, for example will it affect everyone within the enterprise, or a small team.
Figure 5.7 is an indicative example of how this graph might look when populated.
This graph shows the assessment of use cases A, B and C. Use Case A is a very good
fit for DLT adaptation (utility), and will have a large effect on the enterprise (impact) but
will be difficult to implement (ease of implementation). Use Case B alternatively will
have a medium impact and will be very easy to implement - however imposing DLT on
the business process will produce few benefits as opposed to another method. Use Case
C is both a good fit for DLT and is easy to implement, however will have a small impact
on the enterprise (e.g. minimal users, small revenue stream).
Using the above exploration of commercial and academic literature, criteria have been
selected to assess where use cases fall along each axis and how impact can be assessed.
Wherever possible these criteria utilise some measurable aspect of the enterprise so allow-
ing objectivity. It is recognised however that when dealing with complex social systems
(such as an enterprise), and change to those systems, a completely metric driven approach
is difficult to achieve (Hayek, 1989).
5.2.1 Utility Factors
This axis measures the enterprise benefit gain by adopting DLT for a given use case. It
draws on the criteria identified above by Goodhue and Thompson’s (1995), Greenspan
(2015), IBM (M. Gupta, 2017, p. 37), SAP (Roehricht, 2017) and Oracle (Abiodun and
Goel, 2017). Three factors are selected for measuring DSN utility: multiparty, trust and
auditability. For each a score of between zero and five will be accrued, thus a maximum
of 15 (with zero representing least utility).
Before this assessment can be made, there are two obligatory factors. Firstly Green-
span’s (2015) “database” criteria: a structured repository for information must be re-
quired. Use cases without such a repository are awarded a maximum utility score of zero.
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Figure 5.7: Indicative example of evaluation framework
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The second factor concerns Goodhue and Thompson’s (1995) ‘Task Equivocality’ relating
to “ill-defined” or “ad-hoc, non-routine business problems.” Although the data contained
within a DLT might contribute to solving ill-defined business problems, ultimately it is
stored in a structured fashion - so there must be an understanding of what problems exist
for a structure to be imposed. Therefore if the use case involves business problems which
are poorly defined, DLT is unsuited and a maximum utility score of zero should again be
awarded. Once this is completed the factors can be scored as follows:
• Multiparty. The number of organisational boundaries that data is shared across in
the course of the business process. These relate to both internal boundaries (busi-
ness units) and external (different enterprises).
0 If there are no organisational boundaries crossed then a multiparty score of
zero is ascribed.
1 If one internal organisational boundary (i.e. two business units) are crossed
then a score of one is ascribed.
2 If two internal organisational boundaries (i.e. three business units) are crossed
then a score of two is ascribed.
3 If three or more internal organisational boundaries or one external boundary
(i.e. two enterprises) are crossed then a score of three is ascribed.
4 If two external boundaries (i.e. three enterprises) are crossed then a score of
four is ascribed.
5 If three or more external boundaries are crossed then a score of five is ascribed.
• Trust. Whereas organisational boundaries can be precisely measured, trust is an
abstract concept. The literature on trust in organisations was reviewed (Dietz and
Den Hartog, 2006; McEvily and Tortoriello, 2011) and the subject discussed in
interview, which led to the selection of three trust-influencing factors:
– Contractual relationships. Commercial relationships will affect trust. If
one organisation has a contractual relationship which includes performance
penalties or bonuses it will likely have an impact on trust. The same will
apply when organisations share information with competitors. Although this
typically applies to external relationships, it could also apply to internal DSN
business units - especially where written service agreements are used to hold
to account.
– Organisational functions. If organisations are engaged in different areas of
the enterprise (e.g. accounting, personnel) there may be more reticence to let
others alter their data, and therefore less trust. This builds on the work of
Williams (2001) examining outgroups in organisations and finding “different
functional areas ... view members of contrasting groups with distrust, suspi-
cion, and animosity.”
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– Culture. Some organisations are by their very nature less likely to trust others
outside of their sphere - within DSN this applies to those business units which
routinely deal with classified information (e.g. Special Forces, Submarines,
etc) as opposed to more generic areas (e.g. commodity supplies). Another
example of this culture might be expressed by inter-service rivalry (Barlow,
1994).
It is appreciated that the majority of these factors are subjective. However they
can be used to form the basis of an assessment of trust for a use case; which can
then be followed up by more rigorous investigation. Once the trust level has been
ascertained it should be scored from zero denoting full trust, to five: least trust.
• Auditability. This factor is based around the importance of preserving the inform-
ation stored in a DL. The constituents here are:
– Controlled Items. The DSN manages items that are subject to regulatory
control either by domestic or international regulation. Items that fall into this
category are for instance those subject to the Polaris Sales Agreement, Inter-
national Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), Airworthiness items, Attractive
to Criminal or Terrorist Organisations (ACTO), etc. MoD will wish to assure
itself of transactions involving these items, so adding weight to a DLT solu-
tion. Use cases involving these should be awarded two points, depending on
the proliferation of these items (e.g. zero for nil items, one for limited amounts
of controlled items, two for a use case focussed on controlled items).
– Classification. Use cases that concern a classification higher than Official,
will also benefit from DLT’s immutability, typically (depending on the DLT
implemented) by preventing adversaries from reading/writing data without
leaving an audit trail. Use cases featuring classified items should be awar-
ded two points, depending on the extent of classification (e.g. zero for nil
items, one for limited amounts of classified items, two for a use case focussed
on classified items).
– Theft or Fraud. Use cases which are particularly susceptible to theft or fraud
(e.g. high value / attractive or items susceptible to corruption) gain an ad-
ditional one point. This is relatively judgement based due to criminality’s
pervasive nature, however as there is policy ascribing certain items valuable
and attractive, there is some basis for decisions to be made on.
5.2.2 Ease of implementation
While the y-axis of Figure 5.7 represents how suited a particular use case is to DLT ad-
option, the x-axis represents ease of DLT implementation. This measure will allow the
enterprise to consider factors such as time and cost, prior to deciding on what project to
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implement. Studies were therefore analysed which defined taxonomies of constraints to
successful implementation of IS (Yeo, 2002; Al-ahmad, Al-fagih and Khanfar, 2009) -
although what constitutes success (Agarwal and Rathod, 2006; Shaul and Tauber, 2013)
was considered out of scope. One common theme was the importance of soft factors e.g.
project manager (Mohd and Shamsul, 2011), team communication (Mohan, Ahlemann
and Braun, 2011). Despite this soft factors are not measured in the axis as they are typ-
ically reflective of management within the whole enterprise rather than specific to DLT
use cases. It is recognised that further studies may wish to consider this - for instance by
measuring resistance to change or project manager skills.
Instead to determine ease of implementation constraints, two approaches were used.
Firstly adaptive change cases proposed to the Defence Logistics Directorate’s Informa-
tion Systems Working Group were analysed for common themes which had expedited
or stalled implementation. Secondly implementation factors were elicited from inter-
viewees. The above methods, in combination with an analysis of the above literature,
resulted in four factors, again with a maximum score of 15 points (with zero points rep-
resenting most difficulty):
• Contractorisation. There are typically four hierarchies of software development
within the DSN: end user computing (where a non-technical user creates scripts
such as Visual Basic in Excel), software developers within the employ of MoD,
independent developers contracted by a business unit on a project and lastly under-
pinning contracts with a third party for a suite of IS. Each of these methods typically
involves more bureaucracy than the previous and act as a drag on implementation.
Although it is recognised there is currently a dearth of DLT development expertise
(Stein, 2018), this is likely to change over time as the technology becomes more
familiar; meaning all hierarchies, with the possible exception of end-users, will be
able to develop DLT solutions. Where a business unit has in house developers three
points should be scored; independent developers: two; and underpinning contract:
one or zero points depending on the contractual relationship.
• Manual process. The existence of a manual process was an adoption factor high-
lighted by all three blockchain vendors in Table 5.1. However within this DSN
evaluation framework it is used as an implementation rather than utility measure. It
does not feature on the utility axis as computer IS typically aims to improve a paper
based process by digitising it (Stair and Reynolds, 2012, p. 12); this is therefore far
from limited to DLT. It does feature on the implementation axis as within a manual
system it is easier to understand the flow of information and processes, than when
that process is embedded in code which requires specialised skill sets to interpret.
To grade against this metric the researcher should note the number of manual trans-
actions used (e.g. paper forms, faxes, phone calls), as opposed to digital and use
that ratio to score from zero to four - i.e. all manual: four; half manual: two; all
digital: zero.
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• System age. The National Audit Office criticise the DSN for the antiquated nature
of its logistic systems, noting that two of its main inventory IS began service in
the 1980s (Parliament. House of Commons, 2011). The issue of legacy IS inter-
facing with new projects is considered a critical success factor by Fui-Hoon Nah,
Lee-Shang Lau & Kuang (2001) and was revealed as a point of contention with in-
terviewees. Therefore if the oldest system in the use case is less than five years-old
four points are added, and with every five years one implementation point should
be removed - so a 12 year-old system would have two points, and a 20 plus year-old
system zero points.
• Complexity. Beese et al (2016) propose that IS complexity makes adaptive change
more difficult; although as Xia and Lee (2005) discuss there is not necessarily one
agreed way to measure this. Complexity has many definitions (Geraldi, Maylor and
T. Williams, 2011), but for the purposes of this dissertation Beese et al’s structural
complexity (as opposed to dynamic) is most useful; and can be sub-divided into
number (size), variety and interdependence of systems (2016). This measurement
will be a count of the numbers of systems required to integrate with the DLT im-
plemented - four points for a simple web-front end (as comes standard with block-
chains such as IBM Hyperledger’s Fabric), three points for one to five systems, two
points for six to ten systems, one point for eleven to twenty systems and zero points
for over twenty. Both DSN service catalogues (see Section 5.2.3) can be used to
ascertain this figure.
Although the factors for both utility and ease of implementation are rudimentary, it is
nevertheless adequate to provide a scale for comparison of use cases. In practice the scale
is intended to be adapted as circumstances dictate.
5.2.3 Impact
This last metric recognises that high utility and ease of implementation does not neces-
sarily entail impact on the overall enterprise. An example of this is a system which has
low business criticality - for instance a trivial application for recording office chores; or
one which has only a few users.
Naturally business impact will be specific to the enterprise in question. If organisa-
tions are following IT service management best practice, as specified by the Information
Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL), they will be maintaining a service catalogue,
which should capture application business value (Axelos, 2012, p. 104). The DSN has
two applicable service catalogues: the Defence Application Register (DAR) listing all
applications used within MoD, and the Support Chain Information Services Architectural
Repository (SCISRA) which covers applications provided by SCIS. Between them these
contain the following pertinent information:
• Users. An approximate number of users for an application and associated data such
as number of licences and installations.
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• Business Priority. A range of metrics for deciding business priority including
“criticality,” “impact,” “business importance,” ”importance rating” and “deploy-
ment priority”. Although there is considerable overlap these attempt to rate whether
an application supports a business unit’s primary function, and the inconvenience
of a workaround were it not available; the last two also factor in the number of users
an application has.
• Contractual Support. The level of support an application receives when it has
been contracted out to third-party support, particularly Boeing Defence UK (2018).
It is unlikely that either the DAR nor SCISRA are entirely current, however they would
be a good first source of information for measuring business impact.
It is proposed that “importance rating” above (which is scored 0 - 130) should be
used to ascertain impact; by measuring across business priority and users it captures in a
granular way the whole enterprise footprint of an application. For the purpose of visually
representing this data, as at Figure 5.7, the impact score should be used as the circle’s
area, which can be used to ascertain the radius and circumference. For instance a DAR
Importance Rating of 55 would equate to a radius of 4.18 (i.e. 4.18 =
√
55
pi ) . The circle
could then be drawn with a radius of 4.18mm or 4.18cm, or any other scale. Where a
use case covers more than one system then the highest rated Importance Rating should be
used. In cases where there is no application currently in use (e.g. a manual solution) then
the DAR scoring matrix should be used to estimate an Importance Rating.
This mechanism should be adjusted as required - especially should service catalogues
be found out of date. However striving for an objective criteria when measuring business
impact should improve the rigour of a DLT use case selection process.
5.3 Results of questionnaire
The proposed evaluation framework is designed to identify where DLT might be best
adopted in the DSN. However as generic use cases were used to prompt discussion within
interviews, a lightweight version of the framework has been used to assess these. Instead
industry and MoD interviewees rated the utility and ease of implementation of the use
cases (see Appendix A) based on their experience. As the use cases are hypothetical; no
measure of impact (Section 5.2.3), which relies on an importance rating provided by the
business, is given. Data collected from these interviews was averaged amongst the two
sectors and is presented at Figure 5.8.
The ease of implementation axis ranges from one (very difficult) to five (very easy),
while utility ranges from one (not at all useful) to five (very useful). All use cases were
rated above moderately useful (three) by all interviewees. Three use cases (Customs,
E&AM, CfA) shared a similar pattern - compared to technology-sector interviewees, de-
fence considered them easier to implement and greater (or equal) utility. One possibility
is that defence interviewees, being more aware of the problems the DSN faces, are more
70 CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION
Figure 5.8: DSN evaluation framework applied to interview use cases
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open to solutions. Alternatively this may suggest a weakness in the research: the pro-DLT
nature of the introduction videos might have led to a bias in defence interviewees, while
technology interviewees may have a more balanced understanding of DLT.
Codification (Use Case 1) was the exception, with defence-sector considering it more
difficult to implement than the technology-sector (although continuing to believe it had
greater utility). Reasons for this will be considered below in Section 5.4.1.
The easiest use case to implement as rated by the technology-sector was Codification
(Use Case 1), for defence-sector it was joint first with Customs (Use Case 2). Contracting
for Availability (Use Case 4) was considered the hardest to implement by technology-
sector, E&AM by defence-sector. Both defence and technology considered Engineering
and Asset Management (Use Case 3) the most useful and Customs (Use Case 2) the least.
5.4 Generic use cases exploration
This section will discuss the qualitative data collected - the interviewees’ feedback on use
cases.
5.4.1 Codification - Use Case 1
Codification was considered by technology-sector interviewees the easiest use case to
apply to DLT. A major factor in this was the lack of systems complexity - the Codific-
ation Support Information System (CSIS) is one relational database exclusively owned
by MoD. This was coupled with existing business processes - MoD already contracts in
DEFCON 117 (Ministry of Defence, 2013) for this information to be provided - as one
interviewee stated: “we are masters of our own destiny.” This would act as solid found-
ations for a DLT pilot - it could be accomplished internally and then expanded. Another
factor in favour of implementation was that the database contains NATO Stock Numbers
(NSNs) which represent classes of real world objects, but avoids the complications of
trying to track specific, unique items.
The defence-sector gave higher ease of implementation ratings than technology-sector
interviewees in all but one use case: the Codification use case (Figure 5.8). Partly this
was because the UKNCB respondent, being intricately aware of the complexities of co-
dification (e.g. other processes relying on the CSIS database), gave this a lower ease of
implementation score. However other defence-respondents were also sceptical of data
sharing between MoD, prime-contractors and sub-contractors when competition existed
in the network over this data (especially pricing); and therefore believed this would make
implementation difficult. All however rated the use case highly on usefulness - this was
due to the multitude of third parties (e.g. Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM))
involved in the network.
Interviews revealed there could be surprisingly little trust between DE&S Delivery
Teams (DT) as regards item data; for instance one commodity-based team might have no
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requirement for an item being certified (e.g. airworthiness), but this requirement might
not be shared by a DT responsible for supporting complex equipment. This led to a
situation where although CSIS might have one value, a DT could amend this data on a
Base Inventory System otherwise. Participants believed DLT could achieve data integrity
across systems, by ensuring all changes are immutably recorded and that consensus en-
sures only those with relevant permissions are allowed to update - although it might be
argued a well designed relational database would also achieve this. These findings agree
with academic research (Banerjee, 2018) suggesting DLT would be a good fit for master
data management - although authored by a vendor of DLT.
One factor that resulted in easy implementation - that MoD controlled the system and
can demand that suppliers provide details, also attracted criticism regarding the absence of
disintermediation. Greenspan (2015) argues DLT is redundant if a“trusted intermediary”
exists - yet this in theory is the role of UKNCB. There was inconsistency in responses
to this, some interviewees stated industry does not always trust the MoD; for instance
items are not codified because industry is unwilling to provide data containing intellectual
property (e.g. technical drawings) or commercially sensitive information (e.g. price).
Others believed that although the MoD might be a trusted intermediary there was an
issue when contractors were collecting codification data on behalf of other contractors,
as in industry coalitions. Potentially DLT could partly alleviate both problems by giving
OEMs verifiable control over who sees what data - for instance price could be seen by
the MoD, but not by other commercial companies. It is unrealistic however to expect a
technological panacea - industry is likely to wish to keep secrets regardless.
The NAO has reported that codification has not occurred because of the desire to
reduce costs (Parliament. House of Commons, 2017a, p. 31). Interviewees considered
that a UKNCB-run DLT might allow seamless integration of OEM’s databases of items
manufactured or procured, so reducing cost. The emergent nature of DLT means that it
is hard to predict whether DLT would be more cost-effective than a relational database,
though it is possible.
Where the disintermediation argument works in DLT’s favour is codification at a
supranational level. All NSN issued by the UK have the NATO Country Code ‘99’ applied
indicating the country of original codification, this is then shared with other participating
countries via the NATO Master Catalogue of References for Logistics (NMCRL). This is
a loosely coupled system as participating countries need not be NATO members; simply
approved ‘partner’ countries - for instance non-NATO Singapore has the country code of
‘32’ (NATO, 2018). Using DLT the intermediary role of NATO could be considerably
reduced, with associated cost savings. In this scenario manufacturers in each country
would submit transactions (e.g. the creation of a new item of supply) onto a DL; these
transactions would then be checked against the business logic imposed by the relevant
national codification bureau (e.g. all fields contain valid data, the item is unique, etc).
Passing the business logic would result in the transaction being cryptographically signed
with that country’s identifying code and submitted to a ledger visible to all NATO part-
ners. Information could be encrypted for release to specified parties - for instance detailed
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technical drawings might be submitted to the chain, but only viewable by the originating
country and the OEM. This use case deserves further investigation - either at the national
or supranational level.
5.4.2 Revenue & Customs - Use Case 2
This use case was rated as the least useful by both sectors. It was considered the second
easiest to implement by the technology-sector, and joint second by defence. Much of this
lack of utility was due to this use case being the ‘odd one out’ of the four - Revenue &
Customs is something that happens to the MoD, as a transactional cost of doing business,
rather than something MoD sets out to achieve. Correspondingly it was felt there was
little point in MoD forging ahead with something outside its control. A world-class DL
could be established by DE&S to capture this data; but if no one else could be persuaded
to use it (e.g. HMRC, shipping lines, etc), it would be of no use.
Despite this lack of utility, it rated highly for implementation - coming second in
line (although far behind codification). The reasoning behind this was that interviewees
strongly felt that much of the current manual process (e.g. bills of lading) was ripe for
digital conversion. Resultantly there was a strong feeling amongst interviewees that if
another organisation was to lead on this, the MoD should be keen to participate. Sev-
eral interviewees were already aware of organisations pursuing similar endeavours (apart
from the IBM-Maersk trial mentioned in the questionnaire) and that MoD would gain
advantage by joining these schemes when they had reached scale, rather than piloting its
own.
5.4.3 Engineering & Asset Management - Use Case 3
This use case rated as the most useful for both sectors. Part of this might have been cul-
tural - the MoD has been criticised for being more focused on equipment and engineering
rather than the logistics tail supporting that equipment (Parliament. House of Commons,
2017a, p. 8), and this may have been reflected amongst interviewees. Although this seems
unlikely as a reason alone, given that interviewee selection aimed to maximise those with
broad experience of each use case.
Several interviewees referred to current issues affecting Engineering & Asset Manage-
ment (E&AM) systems across DE&S. JAMES (Joint Asset Management and Engineering
Solutions), which records maintenance on land managed equipment, is used by the Armed
Forces but is not implemented by contractors who manage third line warehousing on be-
half of the MoD - which means MoD does not have visibility of its assets throughout
the reverse supply chain. One defence-sector interviewee highlighted that errors occurred
where MoD had lost sight of DE&S assets managed by industry, and pointed to recent
changes in logistic policy to prevent this. Interviewees felt DLT, by integrating contractor
systems with those used by the MoD, might allow this visibility.
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IBM made this point most strongly during discussions. Their view was that DLT
is unlikely to replace current E&AM systems, but rather it would act as back-end glue
allowing assets to transfer seamlessly from the MoD to partners and back; so ensuring the
integrity of records. This solution may be more palatable than trying to assert one system
across a plethora of suppliers, and allows parties to employ systems suited to their own
needs. There is evidence of this approach being investigated by industry, such as Rolls
Royce with aero-engines (Bryan, 2018).
This factor also explained why this use case was rated second most difficult by the
tech-sector, and most difficult by defence. Attempting to connect a DL back-end with
established E&AM systems would be challenging, likely requiring cross industry co-
operation. This could be difficult in a marketplace where vendors use competitive dif-
ferentiation - rather than making their products interchangeable with rivals. Were this to
be achieved however all felt that the gains across the DSN would be significant.
5.4.4 Contracting for Availability - Use Case 4
The Contracting for Availability (CfA) use case was considered the most complicated
of all - and therefore scored lowest in ease of implementation by the technology-sector,
and second most difficult by defence. One defence-interviewee argued that even routine
commercial activities were difficult within MoD, let alone more ambitious plans.
Examples of CfA were elicited during interview to confirm this use case. One current
contract with BAE pays a daily rate when a ship is available for tasking. However when
Operational Defects occur then the MoD gains ‘credits,’ with more serious defects gaining
more credits, which are subtracted from the daily rate. Credits normally commence on the
date a ship signals a defect and end when the ship signals the defect is rectified - however
credits in some circumstances also cease when the contractor can prove dispatch of the
part rectifying the defect. Interviewees confirmed that a source of frustration was having
to audit large amounts of hard-copy paper to compile credits from a variety of sources
at the end of the reporting period. The advantage of a DL which all parties, including
the contractor, could append to, was instantly seen and considered a strong case for the
technology.
This use case is not without flaws. A system which results in winners and losers
will create incentives for people to try and game the system - for instance by claiming
that stores were dispatched earlier than they were. This might especially be the case
where a penalty is imposed by a smart contract; if one can fabricate the data with no
audit process, other than smart contract, then that incentivises malfeasance. Defence and
Security Technological Laboratories (Colley, 2016) raise similar concerns over incentives
encouraging data to be generated to meet targets, rather than record the truth.
A further complication if this use case is to be taken to its ultimate conclusion and
have payment conducted on the blockchain using a cryptocurrency is what might be re-
ferred to as the ‘locked in problem.’ Take a scenario where the MoD were to agree a £12
million availability contract and was going to disburse that money using smart contract
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alone. That would require the MoD providing £12 million in the DL monitoring contract
up-front; if they were not prepared to do this then there would be little assurance that
they would abide by the terms of the smart contract - the SC might ask them to pay, but
they could decide not to. However putting these funds in at the start of the contract is
problematic because it means they cannot be spent elsewhere.
CfA was therefore seen as very useful, but highly complex to implement in a reliable
way.
5.5 Wider use case exploration
A number of interviewees commented that the generic use cases presented were similar,
with one technologist going as far as to state they were “obvious.” This is not necessarily
negative, it is logical for discussion to begin with areas that are better understood. The
generic use cases acted as a jumping-off point for qualitative evidence gathering on other
areas for consideration - the following section expands on this.
5.5.1 Supply chain provenance
An oft cited use case for DLT is supply chain provenance - i.e. verifying the authenti-
city of items and equipment. The use of DLT within defence for provenance has been
proposed by a number of parties including Barnas (2016), Colley (2016) and Hsieh &
Ravich (2017). It was not however selected as one of the four generic use cases within
this research because of the perceived ‘digital-physical gap’ problem. This problem, dis-
cussed in Section 2.3 as part of the share versus prove debate and raised by academia
in Section 5.1.2, is that although a digital object (e.g. a circuit board’s identifying serial
number) might exist in immutable form in a DL, the circuit board in hand is not necessar-
ily the genuine article. Although checking the serial number of a circuit board against a
serial number in a DL, as proposed by Barnas (2016), is better than no form of verifica-
tion; any adversary (e.g. hostile nation states, criminals) capable of creating either a fake
or malicious circuit board, will likely be capable of creating fake serial numbers.
Several methods could be used to mitigate the digital-physical gap:
• Bubble-tagTM (Prooftag, 2017). An adhesive sticker (Figure 5.9) incorporating a
polymer layer that when attached to an item chaotically creates a pattern of bubbles
which can be read electronically (Patraucean, Gurdjos and Conter, 2010).
• Q-IDTM (Quantum Base, 2017). A graphene layer (Figure 5.10) with atomic scale
imperfections that reflect light in such a way that an identifying reference can be
created (Roberts et al., 2015).
• CryptoSeal (Chronicled, 2018). A tamper-proof Radio Frequency Identification
tag (Figure 5.11) read by Near Field-Communication enabled devices; as used by
Thales in a DLT proof of concept to track sensor equipment.
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Figure 5.9: Sample bubble tagTM (Prooftag, 2017)
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Figure 5.10: Q-ID Infographic (Quantum Base, 2017)
Figure 5.11: CryptoSeal (Chronicled, 2018)
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Even more promising solutions exist for assemblies containing integrated circuits, as
incorporated into the mentioned Thales DLT pilot . Here software can be used to prove the
existence of a physical unclonable function (PUF). Due to variations in manufacturing all
integrated circuits will have different physical manifestations - for instance nanosecond
differences in logic gate operations. As these characteristics are embedded in the circuit
they form a signature that is difficult to replicate or change as they are caused by a process
outwith the manufacturer’s control. Although one attack vector might be to simply copy
the signature once it has left the circuit, this is made more complicated by the fact that
more than one test can be run: using different combinations of gates, different temperat-
ures etc. Again this facility is available commercially (Intrinsic ID, 2018) and has been
academically assessed (Gu, Hanley and O’Neill, 2017).
The above examples are far from a comprehensive overview of the market; for instance
it only links physical items to DLT, rather than processes. These exist too however -
the Fishface case study captured video-feed and GPS onto a DLT to record fishermen’s
catches (Z/Yen Group, 2018) for fisheries protection purposes. This summary however
does indicate that the digital-physical gap is bridgeable.
Ultimately it could be argued at a philosophical level the digital-physical gap can
never be truly overcome; for instance how can one be certain that the original equipment
manufacturer is producing what they claim to be producing. However realistically few
security solutions are flawless, and the techniques explored above considerably mitigate
risk. In view of this supply chain provenance is a use case that should merit further
exploration.
5.5.2 Certification
Closely tied to provenance, DLT could also play a role in certification; as noted by De-
fence Research and Development Canada (Willink, 2018). The defence enterprise is in-
volved in many regulated activities: e.g. nuclear engineering, medicine, aviation and of
course the application of lethality. To ensure these activities are conducted in accordance
with external laws and internal regulations, there are a plethora of certificates that apply
to items of supply: from air worthiness conformity to hazard data sheets for cleaning
products. These are typically issued in paper form by an authority and accompany the
item through its life-cycle. This process is error prone: paper certificates can easily separ-
ate from the relevant item, especially as they cross organisational boundaries (e.g. store,
repair, calibrate, etc). This causes a range of issues: in the best case items are quarantined
until a certificate can be sourced, in the worst case they are used in contravention of their
design intent.
Recording certificates for items on a DL can assist with this, due to DLT’s strengths in
public-private key cryptography and the sharing of information across boundaries. Ima-
gine a scenario where a submarine depth gauge is due for periodic calibration: first a
transaction is made in the ledger as the item is passed from depot to third party calibrator;
the third party calibrator then records on the ledger that the item has been calibrated, the
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name of the individual who calibrated it and when that calibration expires, signing it with
a private key so making it irrefutable. When the item passes back to the unit, again recor-
ded in the ledger, the calibration certificate is visible to all. Should a problem be revealed
later it is obvious where blame lies. Furthermore as the certificate is digitised, information
can easily be queried from the chain - it is a simplistic matter for the Commanding Officer
to be presented with a list of all items requiring calibration prior to patrol.
The UKNCB interviewee raised a related problem. When a new item of supply is
codified, for instance a washer supplied by BAE, if certification is required a flag is raised
on the relevant record on the codification system. However when this record is passed
to a base inventory system a project manager might append to that record an item from
a different manufacturer performing the same function (for instance a washer bought off
the shelf from B&Q), but does not have the same certification or quality assurance guar-
antees. This can result in units demanding what they believe is a certified part from one
manufacturer and receiving a non-certified part from another manufacturer. This problem
can be prevented by encoding the business logic in the DL of parties authorised to add new
part numbers to a NSN record. Although this problem can be addressed in a relational
database too, DLT’s difference is that the certification flag could be established during the
OEM creating the item record and promulgated seamlessly to all DL connected systems,
rather than relying on post-event capture by the MoD.
Although not included in the generic use cases, following the course of research it is
believed a strong use case for DLT is the management of certification in the DSN.
5.5.3 Additive Manufacturing
Additive manufacturing (AM), or 3D printing, is where computer technology is used to
solidify material to create an object in three dimensions. It has the potential to revolution-
ise the Defence Support Network as spare parts could be manufactured at the front line to
satisfy immediate demands, rather than being stored and then shipped from a rear echelon
area (Campbell et al., 2011). AM has inherent risks however - including maliciously alter-
ing the design files or copying them without authorisation (so stealing intellectual prop-
erty). Both the US Department of Defence (Dobesh, 2017) and Marine Corps (Daugherty
and Heiple, 2017) believe these risks might be mitigated by DLT, which they are piloting.
Dobesh (2017) proposes a DL as a “ubiquitous data bus,” meaning design files can be
encrypted and only viewable by those with the right privileges, with the immutable nature
of DL preventing alteration prior to manufacture.
This references back to Figure 2.2’s share vs prove Venn diagram. An AM design
file is a digital artefact, in much the same way as cryptocurrency, and therefore sits at the
intersection where a DL can perform both the functions of sharing the artefact whilst at
the very same time validating it. AM within the DSN is at an embryonic stage, therefore
this use case is not an immediate one; although has considerable future potential.
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5.5.4 MoD Coin
Possibly the most unconventional use case is that inspired by discussion with Agility Sci-
ences: MoD Coin. Here when the MoD contracts a good or service it issues to the con-
tractor a token, MoD Coin, stored on a DL. That token is redeemable when the contractor
produces the good or service to an agreed specification, at which point the token holder
can present it to Defence Business Services for exchange with fiat currency. This then al-
lows the contractor who has been issued the token to raise funds to procure sub-assembly
parts or services - they might for instance use them as collateral on a loan from a bank. Al-
ternatively the token could be paid directly to the manufacturer of the sub-assembly, who
would then be able to redeem it when the final product was delivered. This latter might
also be used to gain business intelligence into the MoD network of sub-contractors, be-
low the prime-contractor level; although it would be questionable as to how deep into the
chain this reached - it seems unlikely every sheet of bubble-wrap is going to be accounted
for via this method.
More sophistication could be added to this by other services utilising the MoD coin’s
DL. For instance suppliers could be reviewed: positive for early delivery, negative if late
or not to specification. This would help DE&S Delivery Teams evaluate suppliers used
previously by others. The objects procured using MoD Coin (assuming the object itself
was recorded on chain) could, as previously discussed, have certifications (e.g. tolerances,
etc) recorded against that unique item or batch; this could even be applied by a third party
who cryptographically signs to prove quality control - a condition of the MoD Coin being
redeemed might be that this certification is present; both verification and payment could
then be accomplished via smart contract. Indeed the ultimate conclusion of this is that
contractors might even use MoD Coin as a guarantee to issue their own coin (e.g. BAE
or Babcock Coin), on the same basis as fractional reserve banking, knowing that it is
unlikely all their suppliers would redeem those coins at the same time.
This vision is an exciting possibility, but also the most ambitious use case laid out in
this research. There would be many barriers to adoption - not least government accounting
rules, but also whether they would be accepted by suppliers. Despite these barriers this
could be worthy of further research when this technology is considerably more mature.
5.5.5 Experimentation
If the last use case was unconventional, this final one is counter-intuitive: it does not start
with a use case. Instead this approach proposes individual business units experiment by
adopting DLT to capture information (alongside more traditional methods), learn from
their application and observe where use cases emerge. This is contrary to traditional
MoD processes which begin with capability analysis and requirements; not surprisingly
this strand was inspired by interviews outside the Defence sphere (namely Z/Yen Group
who principally serve the financial industry). Although this use case has risks, specifically
that tax payers money will be expended without deliverables; it is feasible - MoD has the
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organic capability to experiment in this way. After considering DLT’s grand visions, this
concept is refreshing in proposing emergent change arising out of needs identified from
the user-base. This also tallies with Holmes (2017) who suggests that digital disruption
is only learnt in organisations by doing and that small scale pilots are essential to de-risk,
optimise and develop. Whether this theme is taken forward will likely be the result of
individual decisions in various business units, although buy-in by management will still
be required; this research hopes that will be forthcoming.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
DLT emerged from anarchic beginnings, but has the potential to impact all sectors of soci-
ety, the economy and government. Its value comes from allowing different organisations
to reach consensus on shared data, so removing much of the transactional friction com-
mon in business processes. This dissertation thematically reviewed the literature; reported
results from interviews with technical and defence-sector employees on the use of DLT
in DSN and proposed a framework for evaluating the utility, ease of implementation and
impact of DL use cases.
DLT’s utility is not yet proven however, with few existing real-life applications in
industry. Indeed even its definition remains open (Section 2.4), Figure 2.2 illustrated this
showing DLs can look and act radically different from each other and solve divergent
problems. The fountainhead of this activity - Bitcoin - although potentially revolutionary,
is unlikely to have direct applications with the DSN. The evolutionary branch of Bitcoin’s
domesticated off-spring, the permissioned DL, is however worthy of closer examination
as regards the DSN.
This therefore is a conditional endorsement. Applications of permissioned DLT out-
side of test environment are rare, with the exception of purely ‘prove’ deployments such as
Guardtime KSI Blockchain. If efficiency gains were more obvious there would be larger
scale deployment; much current interest is doubtless driven by hype and greed. However
given that this is an emerging technology this is expected.
Even if large scale DLT adoption occurs there is no guarantee that the DSN will prove
a fertile ground for it. One of the key tenets of DLT is disintermediation. While this
attribute is strongly suited to scenarios involving transactions without central authority
and trust - perfect for digital cash for example; it is less easy to apply to government
departments. After all in this instance the trusted central authority to disintermediate,
MoD, is the very entity seeking to use DLT - a serpent eating its own tail.
On the other hand there are pros for adoption in the DSN too. DLT is likely to be
particularly useful when it is applied to situations where assets or services extend outside
the boundaries of the MoD into industry or allied nations; this is one of the hallmarks
of the DSN. Likewise the immutable nature of DLT is particularly useful considering the
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regulatory environment much of the DSN takes place in.
Therefore the MoD should approach DLT cautiously, running pilot projects before
making large scale investment. Due to the pros and cons of adopting DLT in the DSN,
an evaluation framework is required to objectively assess pilot use cases. This research
has proposed such a framework, which measures for utility, ease of implementation and
impact; it is hoped this will help identify DSN processes for DLT adoption. It may also
form the basis of assessment in other areas of MoD, or related industrial sectors.
This research did not aim to identify specific DLT use cases, rather generic use cases
were selected for data gathering. Of these use cases studied, codification (Section 5.4.1)
stood out, both on utility and ease of implementation, as a worthy contender for further
study. Although not included in the questionnaire, it became apparent in the course of re-
search that a use case involving certification (Section 5.5.2), possibly coupled with supply
chain provenance (Section 5.5.1), also deserves further investigation - as it could greatly
aid the challenges the enterprise faces in this direction. It should be emphasised how-
ever that the use cases covered in this research are the genesis for further work, such as
feasibility analysis, and not a definitive statement.
6.1 Strengths and limitations
Exploring the potential of DLT is timely given high-levels of government, business and
academic interest. As a result there is a plethora of research being published, and inter-
viewees have been willing to contribute.
Conducting this research from within the MoD has also been a benefit - previous ex-
perience meant that all use cases proposed were identified by interviewees as being useful
(Figure 5.8). Selecting interviewees from both defence and technology-sectors allowed a
variety of insights to be gained which was useful for considering utility and implementa-
tion factors and meant that enough data was collected to be confident in providing concrete
recommendations. The unique contribution of this research is proposing a framework to
consider how DLT might be adopted, variations of this framework might have wider ap-
plication than the current vogue towards binary-choice flowcharts.
As an emergent technology, DLT research is being generated at a rapid rate: Bano
et al (2017) calculates one paper is produced every day and a half, thus one inevitable
limitation is that this research will have a short shelf life.
Another limitation concerns the sample. Participants might have a positive bias to-
wards DLT: technology interviewees were naturally bullish regarding its long term suc-
cess; defence interviewees might have been biased due to the pro-DLT introduction videos.
It must be noted however that feedback from interviewees indicate they were unlikely to
be blindly positive, as critical discussion was held on the relative merits and drawbacks of
DLT in different areas. Future research could involve a bigger sample and creating a more
‘neutral’ introduction to DLT to reduce bias. Partly this bias is a function of its novelty -
as time passes and there are more deployments of DLs a stronger evidence base will be
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produced as to where this fails or succeeds.
Another lesson for future research is that much evidence may not be in English - con-
sidering the global activity in this - particularly in Asia (see Section 2.4); any following
analysis of current work in this field would have to account for this.
6.2 Recommendations
1. The MoD should pilot use cases of DLT within the DSN to establish whether ef-
ficiency gains can be made. A cautious approach is recommended because of the
emergent nature of DLT. Wide scale adoption or investment would be unwise at this
stage.
2. Pilot projects should be selected carefully because DLT will not be suitable for
all use cases. An evaluation framework would assist in objectively assessing use
cases for DLT adoption. This research has proposed such a framework (Section
5.2); which measures for utility, ease of implementation and impact; either this
framework or a similarly adapted one could assist in selecting pilot use cases.
3. Although the aim of this research was not the selection of pilot projects, it is noted
that use cases involving codification (Section 5.4.1), certification (Section 5.5.2)
and supply chain provenance (Section 5.5.1) appear particularly worth of further
investigation.
4. Once a use case has been selected for piloting then a private and permissioned DL is
more likely to prove successful for enterprise use than a public and permissionless
one. This is due to both classification issues and the requirement within permis-
sionless DLs for there to be an incentive to prevent malicious actors (Section 2.8).
As DLT covers a wide variety of mechanisms for storing data, further consideration
will be required to choose the appropriate DL for the selected use case.
5. Further academic research into organisations that have trialled DLT would benefit
the literature greatly. Much real world enterprise use of this technology is cur-
rently disseminated only via press releases or corporate communications, so lack-
ing objective assessments of benefits and challenges. Gaining access to conduct
this research is likely to prove difficult given that participants may prove reticent to
discuss failure, which could occur frequently in this emergent field.
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Appendix A
Interview questionnaire use cases
A.1 Use case 1 - Codification
Problem All items demanded within the Joint Supply Chain (JSC) should be codified
with a NATO Stock Number. Unfortunately this is often not the case causing ‘grit’ within
the JSC. Non-codified items cannot be demanded in an automated way and resultantly
cannot be accounted for, performance managed or have stock holding levels optimised.
The amount of non-codified items being demanded from deployed platforms can approach
50% of total demands (HMS DARING’s Current Operations\Sidereal\J4\SC PM\dated
20 Oct 13). A contributing factor to not codifying items is financial cost to codify each
item and a workflow penalty (e.g. completing manual forms).
Use case UK National Codification Bureau (UKNCB) maintain a blockchain for the co-
dification of items. Commercial companies wishing to codify items provide information
on these items which are accepted by UKNCB as valid onto the blockchain. Contents
of blockchain are visible to all participants – except where deliberately restricted e.g.
price for commercial confidentiality. Companies are able to update blockchain as items
become obsolete or superseded, with minimal oversight required. Ideally companies in-
tegrate their blockchain node into internal databases of suppliers so allowing frictionless
update. A more developed version of this use case would include sharing this data with
NATO partners, so allowing visibility of NATO Stock Numbers outside of 99 (UK) only.
Advantages As process moves from manual system of updating database to a more
automated one, cost of transactions reduce; more items are put forward for codification.
Disadvantages UKNCB already have a mature technology for recording codification
(eISIS), will require some form of integration.
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A.2 Use case 2 - Revenue & Customs
Problem Dispatching items overseas to meet deployed units, especially by sea freight,
can generate large amounts of paperwork for import / export purposes. The MoD also has
a requirement to provide information to UK authorities (HMRC) on items it is exporting
– the WATERGUARD project has been set up specifically for this. Consignments are
frequently delayed in customs, so resulting in late delivery.
Use case A blockchain is used to provide information to all authorised parties on the
dispatch and handling of sea freight containers, whilst also providing data to HMRC.
This use case has already been established by a pilot project run by IBM and Maersk,
Defence might implement these mechanisms within their own processes and reporting.
Advantages Financial savings as less paperwork required to be raised by MoD, opera-
tional effect as units receive demands in quicker time.
Disadvantages The proportion of sea-freight dispatched by MoD is relatively small
compared to commercial parties (e.g. Maersk), it is uncertain if other participants will be
prepared to change ways of working for small proportion of total.
A.3 Use case 3 - Engineering & Asset Management
Problem Repairable items are frequently required to leave the custody of the MoD for
third-line repair and calibration. MoD would wish to understand the location of these
items at all times (especially items Attractive to Criminal and Terrorist Organisations
(ACTO)) and what modifications have been performed. Likewise Original Equipment
Manufacturers (OEM) would wish to understand what maintenance has been performed
on items at front-line.
Use case As transactions are performed, such as movement of items from MoD to OEM
and maintenance / calibration they can be recorded on the blockchain, likewise inform-
ation such as end of life dates, maintenance frequency etc could also be registered for
the asset. This could be integrated with existing systems within MoD and OEM (e.g.
JAMES/UMMS). A more developed version of this use case would involve smart con-
tracts whereby any item out of date for service is automatically flagged, or any breach
of contract (for instance MoD not returning within certain time) could be notified to
legal/commercial teams.
Advantages Both MoD and OEM have more confidence in equipment state, which pos-
sibly increases reliability as maintenance regime better understood. ACTO incidents (and
other losses) could decrease as whereabouts of items more thoroughly understood.
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Disadvantages Given that E&AM systems are already established, integration could be
required – if not risk ‘swivel-chair’ entry to enable this use case. One might argue current
losses and maintenance recording are cultural as much as technological, therefore a purely
technological fix may not result in significant improvement.
A.4 Use case 4 - Contracting for Availability
Problem Equipment is often contracted by MoD on the basis of availability or reliabil-
ity. Currently manual processes are used to measure this availability / reliability and can
result in disagreements with suppliers over the true picture (financial penalties typically
leading to a low-trust environment).
Use case To record in DLT events which signify contract Performance Indicators e.g.
dispatch of repairable items or advice by contractor, time equipment spent offline, capab-
ility losses, etc. Smart contracts can be used to notify commercial/legal teams of contract
compliance or otherwise – very advanced model could even include automated payment
(although likely to require considerable running in period).
Advantages Financial savings as less manual intervention and human error is involved
in overseeing contracts. As both parties better understand terms of contract they are en-
tering into, future contracts may be optimised as risks or costs are more transparent.
Disadvantages Commercial confidentiality may mean unwillingness to clearly define
terms of contract. One could argue that a level of contract obfuscation may be deliberate
for some parties to ensure Performance Indicators consistently met, which may make
some reluctant to enter this form of monitoring.
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